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INTRODUCTION
To what criminal procedural standard do we hold another
country?1 At first blush, one answer is intuitive: hold other countries
to the same fundamental rights2 enumerated here in the United States.
This procedure is enshrined in the U.S. Constitution, codified in
statute, and articulated in case law. Formally, criminal defendants are
entitled to individual rights such as freedom from unreasonable
search and seizure; guarantees to a speedy and public trial by an
impartial jury; and freedom from cruel and unusual punishment. In
our era of mass incarceration, such formal rights are under attack
given legislative overreach, executive discretion, and judicial
retrenchment.3
1. For purposes of this Article, this is a question focused on the United States as
a jurisdiction evaluating foreign sovereigns and international criminal systems.
Another way of phrasing this question could be “to what criminal procedural standard
should the U.S. criminal justice system hold itself when engaging with foreign criminal
justice systems?” This question is thus related to, but distinct from, the matter of a
global criminal procedural standard, such as that of the international criminal courts
establishing their rules of procedure and evidence, see generally KARIM A.A. KHAN,
CAROLINE BUISMAN & CHRISTOPHER GOSNELL, PRINCIPLES OF EVIDENCE IN INTERNATIONAL
CRIMINAL JUSTICE (2010) (discussing the evolution of rules of procedure and evidence
which have developed in international criminal tribunals).
2. While to some degree, “rights” may be broadly construed to encompass any
criminal legal procedure (for example, the right to have an initial appearance within
the first 24 hours is a procedural right provided under the Federal Rules of Criminal
Procedure), the emphasis of this Article is the rights enumerated in the U.S.
Constitution. Future research could explore more granular procedural details, such as
charging procedure, to show the differential in procedures between two or more legal
systems.
3. See, e.g., William J. Stuntz, The Pathological Politics of Criminal Law, 100 MICH.
L. REV. 505 (2001) (analyzing legislative and judicial aspects of the politicization of the
criminal justice system and why they are barriers to addressing the structural
problems of criminal law); Joshua Kleinfeld, Laura I. Appleman, Richard A.
Bierschbach, Kenworthey Bilz, Josh Bowers, John Braithwaite, Robert P. Burns, R.A.
Duff, Albert W. Dzur, Thomas F. Geraghty, Adriaan Lanni, Marah Stith McLeod, Janice
Nadler, Anthony O’Rourke, Paul H. Robinson, Jonathan Simon, Jocelyn Simonson, Tom
R. Tyler & Ekow N. Yankah, White Paper of Democratic Criminal Justice, 111 NW. U. L.
REV. 1693 (2017) (laying out “thirty proposals for the democratic criminal justice
reform”); Rachel E. Barkow, Prosecutorial Administration: Prosecutor Bias and the
Department of Justice, 99 VA. L. REV. 271, 274 (2013) (showing how the DOJ administers
corrections, forensics, and clemency); see also Nicholas Fandos & Maggie Haberman,
Trump Embraces a Path to Revise U.S. Sentencing and Prison Laws, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 14,
2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/11/14/us/politics/prison-sentencing
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Often overlooked in this discussion is an emerging front in which
U.S. criminal justice may diverge substantially from its centuries-old
procedural framework. Today, all three branches now engage in a
criminal procedural line drawing in which fundamental rights are no
longer so fundamental. Instead, the U.S. government increasingly
distinguishes between a mandatory inner set of truly inviolable rights
and others that it deems marginal and expendable. This arises both
when foreign countries assist in criminal cases and when the United
States facilitates foreign criminal prosecutions. Consider the following
examples:
The United States indicts and arrests a U.S. citizen on drug
trafficking charges. Before her trial, she moves to suppress evidence
that Canadian law enforcement obtained in Montreal without a
warrant and subsequently turned over to U.S. law enforcement.4 The
court denies her motion to suppress on the ground that Canadian law
enforcement’s actions did not “shock the judicial conscience”5 and
thus did not violate her Fourth Amendment right.6
Switzerland convicts in absentia a U.S. citizen for committing
securities fraud in Zurich and then requests that the United States
extradite him to Switzerland to serve his sentence. The fugitive
challenges the extradition before a U.S. magistrate judge, arguing that
the Swiss conviction without his physical presence violated his rights
to confront witnesses and to speedy trial.7 The judge rejects his
challenge on the ground that Swiss criminal procedure is a foreign
affairs matter.8 Shortly thereafter, he is extradited to Switzerland to
serve his sentence there.

-trump.html [https://perma.cc/2NLK-F7RU] (describing executive support for
bipartisan legislative criminal justice reform).
4. U.S. CONST. amend. IV (“The right of the people to be secure in their persons,
houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be
violated, and no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause . . . .”).
5. United States v. Mitro, 800 F.2d 1480, 1483 (1st Cir. 1989).
6. Cf. United States v. Verdugo-Urquidez, 494 U.S. 259, 261 (1990) (holding that
the Fourth Amendment does not apply to search and seizure of property “owned by a
nonresident alien and located in a foreign country”).
7. U.S. CONST. amend. VI (“In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy
the right to a speedy and public trial, by an impartial jury . . . [and] to be confronted
with the witnesses against him . . . .”).
8. In re Ernst, No. 97 CRIM.MISC.1 PG.22, 1998 WL 395267, at *14 (S.D.N.Y. Jul.
14, 1998) (“Ernst claims that his conviction in absentia was ‘fundamentally unfair’
because (1) Ernst was not permitted to call witnesses to testify in his own behalf and
(2) the long delay in the commencement of the trial violated Ernst’s right to a speedy
trial. The rule of non-inquiry precludes the assertion of these claims.”).
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A U.S. national is convicted of possessing cocaine with intent to
distribute. At sentencing, the government moves for an upward
departure of his sentence given a prior conviction in Mexico for
importing narcotic drugs. The defendant objects on the ground that he
was denied both the right to trial by jury and the right to counsel in
the Mexican proceeding.9 The judge splits the difference, finding first
that it would be “cultural imperialism” to insist on a Sixth Amendment
right to trial by jury abroad.10 However, the judge also finds that denial
of right to counsel in Mexican proceedings constitutes a basis for not
relying on the foreign conviction, given that “a central dimension of
American criminal procedure is the presence of counsel at all
significant stages of the criminal proceeding.”11
These examples illustrate the central problem of this Article:
what happens when the United States compromises on rights in order
to facilitate law enforcement cooperation with other nations? This
question arises with increasing frequency due to the accelerating rate
of interaction between national criminal justice systems.12 Today, the
United States has a law enforcement relationship with virtually every
country and is often obligated—either pursuant to treaty or informal
working practices—to assist other countries in their criminal law
enforcement mandates.13 Inversely, these relationships also give rise
to “foreign affairs prosecutions,”14 or U.S. criminal cases with some
foreign nexus. As I have argued previously, such cases—such as the El
Chapo and FIFA prosecutions—are proliferating in an age of crossborder, cyber, and international crime.15 A relevant question in this
9. U.S. CONST. amend. VI (“In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy
the right to a speedy and public trial, by an impartial jury . . . and to have the Assistance
of Counsel for his defense.”).
10. E.g., United States v. Moskovits, 784 F. Supp. 183, 190 (E.D. Pa. 1991) (“It
would, however, be a form of cultural imperialism for the United States to insist that it
would not countenance, for U.S. purposes, recognition of a foreign criminal judgment
which came from a legal culture which did not employ the jury . . . .”).
11. Id. at 191 (“My understanding is that the Supreme Court calls for the presence
of counsel at all significant stages in the American criminal proceeding, and what
analysis we can make of the Mexican procedures, as they affected Mr. Moskovits, would
show the Careo hearings to have been crucial.”).
12. Steven Arrigg Koh, Foreign Affairs Prosecutions, 94 N.Y.U. L. REV. 340, 354
(2019) (noting a significant rise in cases involving foreign activity).
13. Id. at 358 (highlighting “dense network of bilateral treaties regulating law
enforcement cooperation around extradition and mutual legal aid assistance”).
14. Id. at 340.
15. See, e.g., Steven Arrigg Koh, The Huawei Arrest: How It Likely Happened and
What Comes Next, JUST SEC. (Dec. 10, 2018), https://www.justsecurity.org/61799/
huawei-arrest-happened [https://perma.cc/8TY9-HPBR]. International criminal
tribunals are also recognizing the need to foster cross-border law enforcement
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context is what criminal process should govern and protect individual
defendants.
Up until now, scholarship has not comprehensively considered
the nature of such criminal procedural rights and duties in the
transnational context.16 Most of the literature that has addressed this
question—including extradition and the rule of non-inquiry,17
recognition of foreign criminal judgments,18 constitutional
extraterritoriality,19 personal and legislative jurisdiction,20 crosscooperation to provide accountability for crime. See Theodor Meron, Closing the
Accountability Gap: Concrete Steps Toward Ending Impunity for Atrocity Crimes, 112 AM.
J. INT’L L. 433, 441–42 (2018) (discussing steps that state actors and agencies may take
to facilitate prevention and prosecution of atrocity crimes); see also Geoff Dancy &
Florencia Montal, Unintended Positive Complementarity: Why International Criminal
Court Investigations May Increase Domestic Human Rights Prosecutions, 111 AM. J. INT’L
L. 689 (2017) (suggesting that ICC prosecutions may promote domestic human rights
prosecutions).
16. One earlier attempt did so before 9/11 and focused on the doctrinal
developments of Fourth, Fifth, and Sixth Amendment protections. Frank Tuerkheimer,
Globalization of U.S. Law Enforcement: Does the Constitution Come Along, 39 HOUS. L.
REV. 307, 308, 327, 335, 351 (2002). This Article builds upon this foundation in our
contemporary era and does so by situating cross-border law enforcement
developments alongside broader contexts of constitutional legal history, human rights,
and political theory.
17. John T. Parry, International Extradition, the Rule of Non-Inquiry, and the
Problem of Sovereignty, 90 B.U. L. REV. 1973 (2010) (examining the rule of non-inquiry
and proposing more judicial involvement in extradition cases); Lis Wiehl, Extradition
Law at the Crossroads: The Trend Toward Extending Greater Constitutional Procedural
Protections to Fugitives Fighting Extradition from the United States, 19 MICH. J. INT’L L.
729, 732 (1998) (analyzing the lack of judicial involvement in extraditions and the
effect it has on “procedural protections”).
18. Little has been written on the recognition of foreign criminal judgments at
U.S. sentencing, and what has been written has generally argued that courts should be
more circumspect in their consideration of foreign criminal judgments but has not
considered the broader question of cross-sovereign criminal procedural rights. See,
e.g., Nora V. Demleitner, Thwarting a New Start? Foreign Convictions, Sentencing, and
Collateral Sanctions, 36 U. TOL. L. REV. 505 (2005) (arguing for more limited use of
foreign conviction by U.S. courts at sentencing, with concern for whether a foreign
conviction demonstrates a risk of recidivism). See generally A. Kenneth Pye, The Effect
of Foreign Criminal Judgments within the United States, 32 UMKC L. REV. 114 (1964)
(discussing the ambiguity surrounding the effect foreign criminal judgments have
within the United States).
19. Work on constitutional extraterritoriality has often proceeded from the
perspective of the history of American empire and thus constitutional application to
U.S. proceedings. See, e.g., KAL RAUSTIALA, DOES THE CONSTITUTION FOLLOW THE FLAG? THE
EVOLUTION OF TERRITORIALITY IN AMERICAN LAW (2009) (discussing the evolution of
constitutional extraterritoriality and its interrelationship with U.S. history). This
Article, by contrast, focuses on the related but distinct question of U.S. evaluation of
criminal procedural rights in foreign legal systems.
20. Michael Farbiarz, Accuracy and Adjudication: The Promise of Extraterritorial
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border transfer of evidence,21 and judicial engagement with
authoritarian legal systems22—have all considered aspects of core
criminal procedure and/or judicial engagement with foreign legal
systems without recognizing the same overarching phenomenon at
play descriptively or considering its normative implications.
Meanwhile, legal scholarship on procedural rights has done so outside
of the transnational criminal context. Incorporation of the Bill of
Rights—a classic dispute in both Supreme Court jurisprudence and in
legal scholarship—rooted itself in questions of the plain language of
the Fourteenth Amendment Due Process Clause, Framers’ intent, and
policy reasoning,23 but more recent critiques of the selective
incorporation approach to “constitutionalization” of criminal
procedure24 have not been considered in contemporary transnational
criminal debates. The limited international human rights scholarship
on criminal procedural rights focuses primarily on national
constitutional protections25 and, more often, human rights before
Due Process, 116 COLUM. L. REV. 625, 626 (2016) (arguing for due process curbs on
personal jurisdiction in criminal cases); Michael Farbiarz, Extraterritorial Criminal
Jurisdiction, 114 MICH. L. REV. 507, 516–17 (2016) (describing how due process limits
extraterritorial legislative jurisdiction).
21. See generally L. Song Richardson, Due Process for the Global Crime Age: A
Proposal, 41 CORNELL INT’L L.J. 347 (2008) (proposing a transnational due process
model that minimizes foreign policy concerns in the mutual legal assistance context).
22. See, e.g., Mark Jia, Illiberal Law in American Courts, 168 U. PA. L. REV.
(forthcoming 2020) (manuscript at 26–27) (on file with author) (“[C]ourts must
sometimes evaluate foreign law or institutions . . . . Judges may have to assess foreign
laws while managing discovery or while considering forum selection clauses, stays,
and antisuit injunctions. Perhaps the most common ‘evaluative’ doctrines in the
authoritarian law setting are those concerning forum non conveniens and foreign
judgments recognition . . . .”).
23. See Akhil Reed Amar, The Bill of Rights and the Fourteenth Amendment, 101
YALE L.J. 1193 (1992); Raoul Berger, Incorporation of the Bill of Rights: Akhil Amar’s
Wishing Well, 62 U. CIN. L. REV. 1 (1993); Raoul Berger, Incorporation of the Bill of Rights
in the Fourteenth Amendment: A Nine-Lived Cat, 42 OHIO ST. L.J. 435 (1981); Louis
Henkin, “Selective Incorporation” in the Fourteenth Amendment, 73 YALE L.J. 74 (1963);
Lawrence Rosenthal, The New Originalism Meets the Fourteenth Amendment: Original
Public Meaning and the Problem of Incorporation, 18 J. CONTEMP. LEGAL ISSUES 361
(2009); Bryan H. Wildenthal, The Lost Compromise: Reassessing the Early
Understanding in Court and Congress on Incorporation of the Bill of Rights in the
Fourteenth Amendment, 61 OHIO ST. L.J. 1051 (2000).
24. See, e.g., William J. Stuntz, The Political Constitution of Criminal Justice, 119
HARV. L. REV. 780, 781 (2006) (“The constitutional proceduralism of the 1960s and
after helped to create the harsh justice of the 1970s and after.”); Tracey L. Meares,
Everything Old Is New Again: Fundamental Fairness and the Legitimacy of Criminal
Justice, 3 OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L. 105, 113 (2005) (“Codes specify rules, not norms.”).
25. M. Cherif Bassiouni, Human Rights in the Context of Criminal Justice:
Identifying International Procedural Protections and Equivalent Protections in National
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international criminal tribunals.26 And the vast majority of the
scholarship on recognition of foreign judgments is on the civil or
arbitral side.27 This Article builds on this scholarship.
My central argument is that core criminal procedure—a standard
that enumerates certain fundamental procedural rights but allows for
flexibility in evaluating foreign criminal process—should be applied
to all criminal law enforcement cooperation with other nations. To
build this case, Part I will describe how all three government branches
have evaluated other sovereigns using this core criminal procedure
approach, which first emerged in Bill of Rights incorporation and
international human rights engagement but now appears in novel
cross-border electronic evidence cooperation. It will also describe
how, at other times, courts have applied a vaguer outlier approach to
foreign evidence material to conviction, foreign judgments material to
sentencing, and extradition. This Part will also provide an explanatory
account for how these two distinct approaches developed historically.
Part II, drawing on global justice political theory, normatively grounds
core criminal procedure in domestic procedural rights, international
human rights standards, and comparative functionalism. Finally, Part
Constitutions, 3 DUKE J. COMPAR. & INT’L L. 235 (1993) (establishing certain general
principles of human rights protection for individuals in national criminal justice
processes); Chrisje Brants & Stijn Franken, The Protection of Fundamental Human
Rights in Criminal Process: General Report, 5 UTRECHT L. REV. 7 (2009) (considering the
ways in which national jurisdictions’ legal systems promote or hinder implementation
of fundamental rights in criminal process). More fruitful work has, however, been done
on the economic and social rights side. See, e.g., Sital Kalantry, Jocelyn E. Getgen &
Steven Arrigg Koh, Enhancing Enforcement of Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights
Using Indicators: A Focus on the Right to Education in the ICESCR, 32 HUM. RTS. Q. 253
(2010); Katherine G. Young, The Minimum Core of Economic and Social Rights: A
Concept in Search of Content, 33 YALE J. INT’L L. 113 (2008).
26. See, e.g., Sonja Starr, Rethinking “Effective Remedies”: Remedial Deterrence in
International Courts, 83 N.Y.U. L. REV. 693 (2008) (showing how problematic remedial
rules in human rights law may be in the International Criminal Tribunal for the former
Yugoslavia and International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda); David Scheffer & Ashley
Cox, The Constitutionality of the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, 98 J.
CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 983 (2008) (considering the constitutionality of the Rome
Statute provisions in the event of U.S. ratification of the Rome Statute of the
International Criminal Court).
27. See Yuliya Zeynalova, The Law on Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign
Judgments: Is It Broken and How Do We Fix It?, 31 BERKELEY J. INT’L L. 150, 179 (2013)
(noting that countries must acknowledge arbitral awards as binding and carry them
out in compliance with local procedural requirements); David Westin, Enforcing
Foreign Commercial Judgments and Arbitral Awards in the United States, West Germany,
and England, 19 LAW & POL’Y INT’L BUS. 325, 340 (1987) (stating that foreign judgments
in the United States are enforceable unless they are fundamentally in conflict with
basic notions of fairness or key elements of the U.S. legal system).
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III will consider the broader implications of core criminal procedure
for engagement with the International Criminal Court and newer
international investigative mechanisms.
Ultimately, this Article makes four contributions. First, it enriches
historical and contemporary understandings of criminal procedure,
using the cross-border law enforcement context as a launching point
to explore how the U.S. government has negotiated criminal
procedural questions over the last century. Second, this Article
contributes to international law scholarship by showing how the
United States creates and implements bilateral and multilateral treaty
obligations concerning criminal procedural rights. In doing so, it also
provides some guidance for future government actors engaging in
criminal procedural line drawing when negotiating treaties or other
cross-border law enforcement agreements. Third, it adds to the
literature on comparative law, showing how functionalism “touches
down” when legal systems with conflicting criminal procedural norms
interact in cross-border cases.28 And finally, it uses a legal
methodology to inform political philosophy—specifically, global
justice theory—by affirming what specific criminal procedural rights
may constitute a “core” amongst a Rawlsian law of peoples.29
I. CROSS-SOVEREIGN CRIMINAL PROCEDURAL LINE DRAWING:
TWO APPROACHES
This Part describes how the U.S. government engages in what I
call cross-sovereign criminal procedural line drawing, or the process
of evaluating which criminal procedural rights to require when
criminal cases involve another sovereign. As a descriptive taxonomy,
this Part will describe two approaches that the political and judicial
branches have taken in such line drawing. First is the core criminal
procedure or fundamental rights approach, in which the United States
guarantees certain—but not all—enumerated criminal procedural
rights vis-à-vis another sovereign. Second is the minimalist outlier
approach, an ad hoc analysis that ignores criminal procedural
guarantees in all but the most flagrant cases wherein the other
sovereign’s procedure “shocks the conscience.”
The doctrinal contexts in which these issues arise vary greatly.
For example, the United States may send fugitives outward to other
28. Markus D. Dubber, Comparative Criminal Law, in THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF
COMPARATIVE LAW 1277, 1277 (Mathias Reimann & Reinhard Zimmermann eds., 2012)
(“[C]omparative criminal law has attracted little attention, at least compared to other
types of law.”).
29. See infra Part II.A.2.
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countries, whereas other examples involve foreign evidence coming
inward to U.S. criminal cases. Furthermore, they arise at various
stages of the criminal process, such as investigations, pre-trial
litigation regarding admission of evidence, and at sentencing. And yet
all ultimately resolve to the same fundamental issue—holding foreign
sovereigns to a certain criminal procedural standard—and,
ultimately, to the central criminal justice concerns, namely, the
carceral deprivation of liberty or, at the extreme, execution.
The formal, applicable sources of law may also vary. Core
criminal procedure arises when the Supreme Court interprets the Bill
of Rights, or when the political branches negotiate and ratify treaties
related to international human rights or electronic evidence.
Similarly, the “outlier” approach may turn on interpretation of the
Fifth Amendment due process clause, federal courts’ general
supervisory powers, or various judicially-created rules such as that of
non-inquiry. The ambiguity in this space owes to the fact that these
cases lie between two clear poles of constitutional concern. On one
extreme, the Constitution clearly regulates domestic prosecutions;30
on the other extreme, it has nothing to say about a foreign country
prosecuting its own national abroad. These cases unfold in between,
wherein, at times, the Constitution regulates law enforcement conduct
based on territory or nationality, but at other times it does not.31
To be clear at the outset: U.S. criminal procedure is not the
paragon of criminal procedural perfection, and cross-border law
enforcement cooperation is not the sole context wherein criminal
procedural rights are worryingly parsed. Recent federal
jurisprudence has eroded many axiomatic criminal procedural rights
such as the warrant requirement,32 Miranda,33 and the right to counsel

30. E.g., U.S. CONST. amend. XI (describing certain rights and procedural elements
of criminal prosecutions).
31. As Kal Raustiala has noted, “the United States still lacks a firm answer to the
question of whether the Constitution follows the flag, the government, the individual,
or the directive of the president.” RAUSTIALA, supra note 19, at 224. Rising U.S. power
has coincided with a relaxation of traditional Westphalian territorial doctrines;
American courts have frequently accepted executive assertions that constitutional
protections are territorial. Id. at 188–89. This Article focuses on the implications of this
tension, just at the edges of these constitutional protections.
32. See, e.g., California v. Acevedo, 500 U.S. 565, 582 (1991) (Scalia, J., concurring)
(describing the warrant requirement as “basically unrecognizable” due to its many
exceptions).
33. See, e.g., New York v. Quarles, 467 U.S. 649, 657 (1984) (recognizing an
exception to the Miranda rule in situations “posing a threat to the public safety”).

260

MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW

[105:251

at lineups.34 More specifically, even these eroded rights may not apply
in various domestic criminal procedural circumstances. For example,
Boykin rights—applicable in the plea colloquy context—encompass
only the right against compulsory self-incrimination, the right to a jury
trial, and the right to confront witnesses;35 more generally, guilty
pleas short circuit many rights individual defendants may assert in
our criminal justice system.36 Additionally, defendants may not assert
Fourth Amendment claims on collateral review of state criminal
convictions in federal habeas corpus proceedings, given that the
Supreme Court has ruled that the exclusionary rule is a prophylactic
remedy.37 Relatedly, the same applies to judicial restrictions on Bivens
remedies and qualified immunity.38 These contexts differ from the
focus of this Article because they are either not concerned with crosssovereign criminal procedural rights, or arise in the civil context.

34. See, e.g., Kirby v. Illinois, 406 U.S. 682, 691 (1972) (holding that defendants
have no Sixth Amendment right to counsel at a pre-indictment identification because
no adversary judicial proceeding triggering the right has begun); see also, e.g., Akhil
Reed Amar, Fourth Amendment First Principles, 107 HARV. L. REV. 757, 757 (1994) (“The
Fourth Amendment today is an embarrassment. Much of what the Supreme Court has
said in the last half century—that the Amendment generally calls for warrants and
probable cause for all searches and seizures, and exclusion of illegally obtained
evidence—is initially plausible but ultimately misguided. . . . Warrants are not
required—unless they are.”).
35. Boykin v. Alabama, 395 U.S. 238, 243 (1969).
36. See FREDERICK T. DAVIS, AMERICAN CRIMINAL JUSTICE: AN INTRODUCTION 80
(2019) (noting that U.S. criminal procedural rights are premised on the assumption
that a trial will take place, despite the fact that this is an increasingly uncommon
occurrence).
37. See Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S. 465, 493 (1976) (“There is no reason to believe,
however, that the overall educative effect of the exclusionary rule would be
appreciably diminished if search-and-seizure claims could not be raised in federal
habeas corpus review of state convictions.”). But cf. Martinez v. Ryan, 566 U.S. 1, 17
(2012) (“Where, under state law, claims of ineffective assistance of trial counsel must
be raised in an initial-review collateral proceeding, a procedural default will not bar a
federal habeas court from hearing a substantial claim of ineffective assistance at trial
if, in the initial-review collateral proceeding, there was no counsel or counsel in that
proceeding was ineffective.”).
38. Ordinarily, a plaintiff may maintain suit against a government officer under
two circumstances: (1) where the officer allegedly acted outside of delegated statutory
power, or (2) where the officer acted within the conferred statutory limits of the office
but allegedly offended a provision of the Constitution. Larson v. Domestic & Foreign
Com. Corp., 337 U.S. 682, 689–91 (1949). Nonetheless, Congress retains the authority
to adopt alternative remedies for resolving legal complaints. See Gregory C. Sisk, A
Primer on the Doctrine of Federal Sovereign Immunity, 58 OKLA. L. REV. 439, 456–57
(2005).
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A. THE CORE CRIMINAL PROCEDURE APPROACH
Pursuant to the core criminal procedure approach, the United
States guarantees certain—but not all—enumerated criminal
procedural rights vis-à-vis another sovereign. This approach has
emerged in the history of incorporation of the Bill of Rights,
negotiation and ratification of international human rights treaties, and
in the Clarifying Lawful Overseas Use of Data (CLOUD) Act of 2018.
1. Incorporation of the Bill of Rights
Core criminal procedure originates in the U.S. Supreme Court
and, more specifically, the beginnings of the “constitutionalization” of
criminal procedure. Of course, the history of incorporation of the Bill
of Rights’ criminal procedural protections through the Fourteenth
Amendment is as canonical as it is familiar. Adopted in the wake of the
U.S. Civil War, the Fourteenth Amendment prohibits individual states
from “depriv[ing] any person of life, liberty, or property, without due
process of law.”39 From the early 1930s to early 1960s,40 the Supreme
Court interpreted this clause not as requiring that states uphold the
criminal procedural protections in the Bill of Rights, but as protecting
“fundamental fairness.”41 For example, in Powell v. Alabama, the Court
found that a state’s denial of counsel deprived due process in the
infamous Scottsboro trial, a capital case involving two African
Americans convicted of rape without, inter alia, the assistance of an
attorney at trial.42 In holding that the Fourteenth Amendment
protects fundamental rights, the Court emphasized that such
protection was “not because those rights are enumerated in the first
eight Amendments, but because they are of such a nature that they are
included in the ‘conception of due process of law.’”43 In weighing
whether the Fourteenth Amendment protected from state action
rights enumerated in the Fifth and Sixth Amendments, the Court asked
whether such a right constituted one of the “fundamental principles of

39. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV.
40. See Jerold H. Israel, Selective Incorporation Revisited, 71 GEO. L.J. 253, 256, 304
(1982) (noting that an initial period of “fundamental fairness” application began in the
wake of the adoption of the Fourteenth Amendment and lasted until the early 1960s).
41. Id. at 273.
42. 287 U.S. 45, 71 (1932).
43. Id. at 67–68 (quoting Twining v. New Jersey, 211 U.S. 78, 99 (1908)); ERWIN
CHEMERINSKY & LAURIE L. LEVENSON, CRIMINAL PROCEDURE: INVESTIGATION 21 (3d ed.
2018).
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liberty and justice which lie at the base of all our civil and political
institutions.”44
But starting in 1961, the Warren Court moved toward a right-byright “selective incorporation” approach to criminal procedural
protections,45 ultimately incorporating through the Fourteenth
Amendment due process clause virtually all of the Bill of Rights’
criminal procedural guarantees, a process continuing to the present
day.46 Such abandonment of the fundamental fairness approach is
widely recognized as “one of the most important legacies of the
Warren Court. . . .”47 In opting for selective incorporation, the
Supreme Court articulated a test wherein it would first look at the
entirety of the right (as opposed to a fact-specific analysis) and then
ask whether the provision is “fundamental to our scheme of ordered
liberty”48 or “deeply rooted in this Nation’s history and tradition.”49
Drawing on this analysis, the Court has by now incorporated virtually
all rights,50 including: the warrant requirement,51 exclusionary rule,52
and freedom from unreasonable searches and seizures53 under the
Fourth Amendment; the Double Jeopardy Clause,54 privilege against

44. Powell, 287 U.S. at 67 (citing Hebert v. Louisiana, 272 U.S. 312, 316 (1926)).
45. See George C. Thomas III, The Criminal Procedure Road Not Taken: Due Process
and the Protection of Innocence, 3 OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L. 169, 172 (2005) (“Of the criminal
procedure rights in the Bill of Rights, the first incorporation was not until 1961 when
the Court [in Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961)] required states to follow the Fourth
Amendment exclusionary rule and suppress evidence that had been unconstitutionally
seized.”); Israel, supra note 40, at 253 (“In June 1960 Justice Brennan’s separate
opinion in Ohio ex rel. Eaton v. Price set forth what came to be the doctrinal foundation
of the Warren Court’s criminal procedure revolution . . . [and] what is now commonly
described as the ‘selective incorporation’ theory of the [F]ourteenth [A]mendment.”
(footnote omitted)).
46. See generally, e.g., Timbs v. Indiana, 139 S. Ct. 682, 686–87 (2019)
(incorporating the Eighth Amendment’s Excessive Fines Clause against the states).
47. See Meares, supra note 24.
48. See, e.g., Timbs, 139 S. Ct. at 686–88 (applying this test to the Excessive Fines
Clause of the Eighth Amendment); McDonald v. City of Chicago, 561 U.S. 742, 758–59
(2010) (applying this test to the Second Amendment).
49. See McDonald, 561 U.S. at 767 (quoting Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S.
702, 721 (1997)).
50. See generally RUSSELL L. WEAVER, JOHN M. BURKOFF & CATHERINE HANCOCK,
CRIMINAL PROCEDURE: A CONTEMPORARY APPROACH 25–26 (2d ed. 2018).
51. Aguilar v. Texas, 378 U.S. 108 (1964).
52. Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 659–60 (1961).
53. Wolf v. Colorado, 338 U.S. 25, 25–26 (1949).
54. Benton v. Maryland, 395 U.S. 784, 787 (1969).
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self-incrimination,55 and Just Compensation Clause56 under the Fifth
Amendment; the rights to trial by jury,57 compulsory process,58
speedy trial,59 confrontation of adverse witnesses,60 and assistance of
counsel61 under the Sixth Amendment; and the prohibitions against
cruel and unusual punishment,62 excessive bail,63 and excessive
fines64 under the Eighth Amendment. At time of writing, the only
criminal procedural rights not to be incorporated are the Fifth
Amendment right to indictment by a grand jury and Sixth Amendment
right to a jury selected from residents of the state and district where
the crime occurred.65 Once a protection is incorporated, “there is no
daylight between the federal and state conduct it prohibits or
requires.”66
This history is relevant to core criminal procedure in three ways.
As an initial matter, incorporation exposes the inherent challenges in
criminal procedural line drawing. The Fourteenth Amendment
incorporation debates among the members of the U.S. Supreme Court
illustrate the slippery nature of this inquiry. For example, in Duncan v.
Louisiana, Justices White and Harlan, purporting to apply the same
standard, disagreed as to whether it was “fundamentally unfair” for
the state of Louisiana to withhold from Gary Duncan the right to a jury
trial for the charge of simple battery.67 Meanwhile, in a concurring
opinion, Justice Black altogether rejected the doctrine of fundamental
fairness, stating that such inquiry “depends entirely on the particular

55. Malloy v. Hogan, 378 U.S. 1, 2–3 (1964).
56. Chi., Burlington & Quincy R.R. Co. v. Chicago, 166 U.S. 226, 233–34 (1897).
57. Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145, 149 (1968).
58. Washington v. Texas, 388 U.S. 14, 17–19 (1967).
59. Klopfer v. North Carolina, 386 U.S. 213, 223 (1967).
60. Pointer v. Texas, 380 U.S. 400, 403 (1965).
61. Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335, 339–40 (1963).
62. Robinson v. California, 370 U.S. 660, 666 (1962).
63. Schilb v. Kuebel, 404 U.S. 357, 365 (1971).
64. Timbs v. Indiana, 139 S. Ct. 682, 691 (2019).
65. F. Andrew Hessick & Elizabeth Fisher, Structural Rights and Incorporation, 71
ALA. L. REV. 163, 168, 175 n.78 (2019).
66. Timbs, 139 S. Ct. at 685 (noting that the only exception is the Sixth
Amendment requirement of jury unanimity).
67. Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145, 149, 193 (1968). Justice White, writing for
the majority, held that “trial by jury in criminal cases is fundamental to the American
scheme of justice,” id. at 149, while Justice Harlan, in dissent, stated that trial by jury is
“a good means [of trying criminal cases], but it is not the only fair means, and it is not
demonstrably better than the alternatives States might devise,” id. at 193 (Harlan, J.,
dissenting).
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judge’s idea of ethics and morals instead of requiring him to depend
on the boundaries fixed by the written words of the Constitution.”68
Second, incorporation reveals the three options available to
courts when evaluating the criminal procedures of other sovereigns.
One is a “hands off” approach, permitting the other sovereign
discretion to guarantee whichever criminal procedural rights it deems
to be fundamental. The opposite extreme is a total incorporation, or
“normalization” approach, calling for criminal procedure to be coextensive with that of the U.S. Bill of Rights and related rights flowing
from them. The middle option—between rigorous insistence on
identical procedural guarantees and laissez-faire permissibility of all
foreign procedure—consists of two other possibilities. Courts can
selectively incorporate a core criminal procedure by guaranteeing
only certain rights, rooted in notions of fundamental guarantees in
Anglo-American jurisprudence. Or, courts may apply a more nebulous
fundamental fairness or “outlier test” in which much state
investigative and/or adjudicative action is permitted unless the other
sovereign grossly violates some core criminal procedural norm.
Finally, the long history of incorporation has given room to
understand the positives and negatives of a fundamental rights
approach to criminal procedure. For example, William Stuntz has
famously critiqued the Warren Court’s procedural revolution as
spawning aggressive law enforcement in the latter part of the 20th
century.69 Additionally, Tracey Meares has argued that codes such as
the Bill of Rights are advantageous in promoting reform, given that
they specify rules over norms and provide “sharp-edged prophylactic
prohibitions” that guard against suspicion of judicial actors otherwise
prepared to justify law enforcement practices using open-ended
fundamental fairness norms.70 The flip side, though, is that such rules
may be crudely inflexible and may create costs relating to under- and
over-inclusiveness.71

68. Id. at 168–69 (Black, J., concurring); see also Fed. Power Comm’n v. Nat. Gas
Pipeline Co., 315 U.S. 575, 600–01 (1942) (Black, Douglas, and Murphy, JJ., concurring)
(discussing how the fundamental fairness doctrine is an elastic approach allowing
judges to substitute for legislatures).
69. Stuntz, supra note 24 (“The constitutional proceduralism of the 1960s and
after helped to create the harsh justice of the 1970s and after.” (footnote omitted)).
70. See Meares, supra note 24 (“Codes specify rules, not norms.”).
71. Id.
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2. International Human Rights with Criminal Procedural
Guarantees
Core criminal procedure also animates U.S. engagement with
international human rights law. During the mid-20th century,
countries had to agree on certain core criminal procedural rights in
the drafting of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR), as
well as in the ratification of the International Covenant on Civil and
Political Rights (ICCPR).72 In contrast to judicial right-by-right
incorporation, here the political branches could comprehensively
assess a system of rights to establish as core.
The early UDHR negotiation history shows that the United States
did not expect to parse the definition and scope of human rights.73 The
U.S. government initially favored including an international bill of
rights into the U.N. Charter, focusing specifically on civil and political
rights similar to those in the U.S. Bill of Rights—instead of economic
rights and enforcement measures.74 The U.S. delegation assumed that
human rights were clearly defined concepts, with a focus on civil and
political rights as opposed to economic security rights;75 so while
there was some discussion of certain freedoms relevant to Franklin D.
Roosevelt’s “four freedoms” speech from 1941,76 the delegation did
little preparatory work to define human rights in a broader, crosscultural sense.77

72. Zachary Elkins, Tom Ginsburg & Beth Simmons, Getting to Rights: Treaty
Ratification, Constitutional Convergence, and Human Rights Practice, 54 HARV. L. REV.
61, 65–66 (2013) (noting the process of countries agreeing on certain rights, in
particular criminal procedural rights, when drafting the UDHR).
73. See generally SAMUEL MOYN, THE LAST UTOPIA: HUMAN RIGHTS IN HISTORY 62–72
(2010) (reviewing the history of the UDHR negotiation and highlighting the crosscultural complexities in doing so).
74. See M. GLEN JOHNSON & JANUSZ SYMONIDES, THE UNIVERSAL DECLARATION OF
HUMAN RIGHTS: A HISTORY OF ITS CREATION AND IMPLEMENTATION 1948–1998, at 28–29
(1998).
75. See id. at 40–42 (describing the clash of values and particularly the
assumptions of the American Law Institute on foundational rights).
76. See generally Franklin D. Roosevelt, President of the U.S., Eighth Annual
Message to Congress (Four Freedoms Speech) (Jan. 6, 1941) (listing four key human
freedoms including (1) freedom of speech and expression; (2) freedom of every person
to worship God in their own way; (3) freedom from want; and (4) freedom from fear).
77. Even the American Law Institute, which in 1942 appointed a committee of
lawyers and political scientists from several different countries including Germany,
Poland, India, and Lebanon, was unable to reach complete consensus regarding the
definition of human rights. JOHNSON, supra note 74, at 40–41; see also Statement of
Essential Human Rights Presented by the Delegation of Panama, U.N. Doc. A/148 (Oct.
24, 1946) (defining essential freedoms).
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However, disagreements with foreign nations as to the substance
and language of such rights led the United States and other
participating nations to conclude that a separate bill of rights should
be drafted and negotiated in order to ensure that the U.N. Charter
itself was adopted, leaving the Charter with only a brief reference to
human rights.78 When the time came to negotiate the Declaration
itself, the various parties aimed to articulate “a common conception of
human rights that would command acceptance despite huge
differences in culture, political systems, geographic location and
economic circumstance.”79 Negotiations ultimately turned on a
variety of tensions, including natural law versus positivism, liberalism
versus Marxism, and western perspectives versus non-western
perspectives.80
With regard to criminal procedure, an initial question of the
UDHR drafting process was which rights to even include.81 Designed
precisely to strengthen the independence of the judiciary, Articles 6–
12 are the UDHR’s central provisions concerning the rights of
defendants in criminal proceedings.82 In the end, the UDHR’s final text
protects only a few criminal procedural rights, lacking the specificity
of the U.S. Bill of Rights but affirming general principles that are
immanent in the U.S. Constitution. In particular, Articles 6–12
guarantee universal recognition as a person and equality before the
law,83 effective judicial remedy for violation of fundamental rights,84
freedom from arbitrary arrest or detention,85 “full equality to a fair
and public hearing by an independent and impartial tribunal,”86
presumption of innocence,87 protection against retroactivity,88 and
protection against “arbitrary interference” with a person’s “privacy,

78. JOHNSON, supra note 74, at 27–29. See also Delegation of Panama, Statement of
Essential Human Rights Presented by the Delegation of Panama, U.N. Doc. A/148 (Oct.
24, 1946).
79. JOHNSON, supra note 74, at 39.
80. Id. at 42–48; SAMUEL MOYN, NOT ENOUGH: HUMAN RIGHTS IN AN UNEQUAL WORLD
57–61 (2018) (reviewing the history of UDHR negotiation).
81. JOHANNES MORSINK, THE UNIVERSAL DECLARATION OF HUMAN RIGHTS: ORIGINS,
DRAFTING, AND INTENT 51 (1999).
82. See id. at 49–58.
83. G.A. Res. 217 (III) A, UDHR, arts. 6–7 (Dec. 10, 1948) [hereinafter UDHR].
84. Id. art. 8.
85. Id. art. 9.
86. Id. art. 10.
87. Id. art. 11(1).
88. Id. art. 11(2).
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family, home or correspondence.”89 In other words, such rights
constitute a core criminal procedure narrower than that guaranteed
in the U.S. Constitution: rights to assistance of counsel, freedom from
cruel and unusual punishment, and unreasonable search and seizure
are all absent.90
History reveals that the U.S. delegation initially favored a more
robust conception of rights in the UDHR. Specifically, the United States
made proposals to expand the protections guaranteed by these
articles. For example, the United States proposed that the UDHR
include the right of arrestees to “be promptly informed of the charges
against [them], and to trial within a reasonable time or to be
released,”91 but the provision’s final form guarantees protection
against merely “arbitrary arrest, detention, or exile.”92 Additionally,
the United States proposed adding the rights of confrontation and
counsel,93 but the final language of the provision only guarantees “a
fair and public hearing by an independent and impartial tribunal.”94
Criminal procedural line drawing was not only evident in the
negotiation of the UDHR; it was also apparent in the ratification of
international human rights treaties.95 In particular, this arose in U.S.
action regarding Article 14 of the ICCPR, which requires rights such as
equality before courts and tribunals, presumption of innocence,
presence at criminal trial without undue delay, appeal, and double
jeopardy.96 Here, the United States for the first time curtailed rights

89. Id. art. 12.
90. See generally id.
91. 1 THE UNIVERSAL DECLARATION OF HUMAN RIGHTS: THE TRAVAUX PRÉPARATOIRES
1023 (William A. Schabas ed., 2013) [hereinafter U.S. SUGGESTIONS FOR UDHR].
92. UDHR, supra note 83, art. 9.
93. U.S. SUGGESTIONS FOR UDHR, supra note 91, at 712.
94. UHDR, supra note 83, art. 10. Although Article 11 provides to the accused “all
the guarantees necessary for his defence [sic],” it does not expressly provide for the
right to the assistance of counsel. Id. art. 11.
95. Given its status as a declaration, the UDHR is not a human rights treaty,
though many of the UDHR’s provisions have been incorporated into customary
international law, incorporated into domestic law via other human rights treaties, or
otherwise incorporated into domestic law. Hurst Hannum, The UDHR in National and
International Law, 3 HEALTH & HUM. RTS. 144, 145–46 (1998).
96. See International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights art. 14, Dec. 19, 1966,
S. EXEC. DOC. NO. E, 95-2, 999 U.N.T.S. 171 [hereinafter ICCPR]; Hum. Rts. Comm.,
General Comment No. 32: Article 14: Right to Equality Before Courts and Tribunals and
to a Fair Trial, ¶¶ 3–4, U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/GC/32 (Aug. 23, 2007) (noting the
complexities of the various Article 14 guarantees with different scopes of application,
though noting that a general reservation to the right to a fair trial would defeat the
object and purpose of the treaty).
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located beyond its core conception.97 Specifically, it did so by attaching
certain reservations, understandings, and declarations (RUDs) to its
ratification of the ICCPR.98
For example, with regard to the right to counsel, the United States
stated its understanding that the guarantee of “legal assistance of
[one’s] choosing”99 does not require the provision of a criminal
defendant’s counsel of choice when the defendant is provided with
court-appointed counsel on ground of indigence, when the defendant
is financially able to retain alternative counsel, or when imprisonment
is not imposed.100 Additionally, with regard to the right to “obtain the
attendance and examination of witnesses on his behalf,” the United
States expressed understanding that such right does not prohibit the
requirement that a defendant seeking to compel a witness must show
that such witness is necessary for her defense.101 Further, the United
States reserved its acceptance of a separate criminal procedural
standard for juveniles as compared with adults, maintaining that, in
exceptional circumstances, juveniles may be treated as adults in
criminal proceedings.102 Finally, the United States attached RUDs to
its acceptance of the ICCPR guarantees regarding compensatory
damages103 and rights against double jeopardy.104
97. See David P. Stewart, United States Ratification of the Covenant on Civil and
Political Rights: The Significance of the Reservations, Understandings, and Declarations,
42 DEPAUL L. REV. 1183, 1186 (1993).
98. “RUDs” are the “reservations, understandings, and declarations” upon which
U.S. ratification of the ICCPR was conditioned, proposed by the Carter Administration
after extensive inter-agency review and consultation. See id. 1199–1200.
99. ICCPR, supra note 96.
100. Stewart, supra note 97, at 1199–1200.
101. Id. at 1200.
102. Id. at 1195.
103. While the ICCPR guarantees compensatory damages for unlawful arrests, the
United States does not generally accord a right to compensation for an arrest or
detention made in good faith but ultimately determined to have been unlawful. See id.
at 1197–98.
104. Again, the United States stated its understanding that the ICCPR prohibition
against double jeopardy is not absolute; it applies only when the judgment of acquittal
has been rendered by a court of the same governmental unit, whether the federal
government or a constituent unit. See id. at 1200. Finally, of the seven major
international human rights treaties, the only other to touch on criminal procedural
guarantees is the U.N. Convention against Torture, which includes provisions that bear
on criminal procedural rights. See UNFPA, Core International Human Rights
Instruments, UNITED NATIONS POPULATION FUND (2004), https://www.unfpa.org/
resources/core-international-human-rights-instruments
[https://perma.cc/SV4H
-VZMS]; Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading
Treatment or Punishment art. 3, Feb. 4, 1985, S. TREATY DOC. NO. 100-20, 1465 U.N.T.S.
85 [hereinafter CAT].
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3. Electronic Evidence
The final example of core criminal procedure is the most cutting
edge. The U.S. government has recently articulated core criminal
procedure in statutory rules governing the transmission of in-country
electronic data abroad for use in foreign criminal cases. The Clarifying
Lawful Overseas Use of Data (CLOUD) Act, enacted in 2018, is best
known for amending the Stored Communications Act to allow U.S. law
enforcement to compel internet service providers (ISPs) to provide
data stored on servers abroad.105 However, it also empowers the
executive branch to enter bilateral agreements with foreign
governments, which may then directly request electronic data from
U.S. ISPs and use that data as evidence in a foreign prosecution.106 In
many cases, this obviates the need for mutual legal assistance,
increasing efficiency in law enforcement cooperation.107
Notably, the Act mandates that the Attorney General, with the
concurrence of the Secretary of State, certify to Congress its
determination, inter alia, that every foreign legal system “afford[]
robust substantive and procedural protections for privacy and civil
liberties.”108 The Act provides both procedural and substantive
guidance as to how the executive branch should make that
determination, mandating that it consider factors such as “adequate
substantive and procedural laws on cybercrime and electronic
evidence,”109 respect for the rule of law and nondiscrimination
principles, and applicable human rights standards.110 Regarding the
latter, the Act specifies rights such as “protection from arbitrary and
unlawful interference with privacy;” “fair trial rights;” “freedom of
expression, association, and peaceful assembly;” “prohibitions on
arbitrary arrest and detention;” and “prohibitions against torture and

105. See 18 U.S.C. § 2713 (“A provider of electronic communication service or
remote computing service shall comply with the obligations of this chapter to preserve,
backup, or disclose the contents of a wire or electronic communication . . . regardless
of whether [it] is located within or outside of the United States.”).
106. See id. § 2523(b).
107. See generally U.S. DEP’T OF JUST., PROMOTING PUBLIC SAFETY, PRIVACY, AND THE
RULE OF LAW AROUND THE WORLD: THE PURPOSE AND IMPACT OF THE CLOUD ACT (2019),
https://www.justice.gov/opa/press-release/file/1153446/download [https://
perma.cc/Y2DP-8JTC] (noting the purpose and potential benefits of the CLOUD Act).
108. See 18 U.S.C. § 2523(b).
109. See id. § 2523(b)(1)(B)(i) (specifying that states may demonstrate this by
being a party to the Convention on Cybercrime, which entered into force January 7,
2004, or through domestic laws that are consistent with the Convention).
110. See id. § 2523(b)(1)(B)(i)–(iii).
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cruel, inhuman, or degrading treatment or punishment.”111 It also
categorically exempts such certifications and determinations from
judicial review.112
In summary, the core criminal procedure approach explicitly
guarantees certain fundamental rights. In the incorporation context,
core criminal procedure encompasses virtually all U.S. Bill of Rights
guarantees, save for the Fifth Amendment right to indictment by
grand jury and the Sixth Amendment right to a jury selected from
residents of the state and district where the crime occurred. The
ICCPR provides rights of intermediate specificity—including rights to
presence at trial without undue delay, presumption of innocence, and
protection against double jeopardy.113 And the UDHR and CLOUD Act
provide the most basic minimum guarantees to fair trial rights and
prohibitions on arbitrary arrest and detention.114
B. THE OUTLIER APPROACH
While core criminal procedure, in the contexts above, is
enumerated, prospective, and relatively coherent in its approach to
fundamental rights, the outlier approach described in this Part is
imprecise, retrospective, and ad hoc. Pursuant to this approach, in all
but the most flagrant cases of foreign criminal justice system abuse,
U.S. courts will problematically draw criminal procedural lines to
admit foreign evidence, consider foreign convictions, or extradite to
foreign countries.

111. Id. § 2523(b)(1)(B)(iii). The Act also specifies certain requirements for the
agreements themselves, such as a prohibition on targeting U.S. persons. See id.
§ 2523(b)(4).
112. See id. § 2523(c). The CLOUD Act also notes that “[i]nternational agreements
provide a mechanism for resolving these potential conflicting legal obligations where
the United States and the relevant foreign government share a common commitment
to the rule of law and the protection of privacy and civil liberties.” Clarifying Lawful
Overseas Use of Data (CLOUD) Act, Pub. L. No. 115-141, div. V, § 102, 132 Stat. 1213,
1213 (2018). Given the CLOUD Act was recently passed into law, it has not yet been
tested in the courts nor discussed in depth in academic literature. This will surely
change soon, however. In October 2019, the United States and United Kingdom
concluded the first bilateral agreement under the Act, paving the way for each country
to obtain electronic evidence directly from ISPs in the territory of the other. See
Agreement on Access to Electronic Data for the Purpose of Countering Serious Crime,
U.K.-U.S., Oct. 3, 2019, CS USA No. 6/2019.
113. See ICCPR, supra note 96.
114. See UDHR, supra note 83, arts. 6–12; CAT, supra note 104; 18 U.S.C.
§ 2523(b)(1)(B)(ii)–(iii).
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1. Evidence Material to Conviction
The outlier approach manifests itself, first, when foreign law
enforcement investigators produce evidence that U.S. prosecutors
move to admit in U.S. criminal proceedings.
This issue presents itself with increasing frequency today, but its
roots are of old vintage.115 While the U.S. Constitution is silent
regarding its territorial reach, the Insular Cases of 1901 distinguished
between incorporated and unincorporated territories as respective
zones in which “fundamental” and “nonfundamental” constitutional
limitations applied, respectively.116 From this point until the 1950s,
constitutional rights “follow[ed] the flag”—i.e., to newly-acquired
territories—but nowhere else.117 And while the plurality opinion in
the 1957 case Reid v. Covert reasoned that Bill of Rights protections
should apply to U.S. citizens everywhere,118 Justice Kennedy’s
approach, first articulated in his concurrence in United States v.
Verdugo-Urquidez (1990) and later in his majority opinion in
Boumediene v. Bush (2008), held that the Constitution does not apply
abroad—at least with regard to foreign nationals—when it would be
“impracticable and anomalous.”119 The issue in many of these cases
differed slightly from the question at hand in this Article, however,
because they largely concerned application of the U.S. Bill of Rights to
the American empire, i.e., to the United States acting as sovereign,
albeit outside of core U.S. territory. In other words, the central
question in such cases was whether the Constitution protected
Americans that the U.S. government tried overseas.120 A related but
115. See generally RAUSTIALA, supra note 19 (discussing the evolution of
constitutional extraterritoriality and its interrelationship with U.S. history).
116. See Gerald L. Neuman, Understanding Global Due Process, 23 GEO. IMMIGR. L.J.
365, 366 (2009).
117. RAUSTIALA, supra note 19, at 25–26.
118. See Reid v. Covert, 354 U.S. 1, 17 (1957).
119. Boumediene v. Bush, 553 U.S. 723, 759 (2008) (citing United States v.
Verdugo-Urquidez, 494 U.S. 259, 277–78 (1990) (Kennedy, J., concurring)); see also
Neuman, supra note 116, at 375 (“We may assume, however, that U.S. citizens retain
their belief in U.S. privacy values even when present in countries with different
customs, and we might regard as legitimate the citizens’ expectation that their own
government . . . would behave consistently toward them.”).
120. See RAUSTIALA, supra note 19, at 140 (“[B]oth cases posed a familiar question:
did the Constitution protect Americans tried overseas by the U.S. government?”); see
also Sarah H. Cleveland, Powers Inherent in Sovereignty: Indians, Aliens, Territories, and
the Nineteenth Century Origins of Plenary Power over Foreign Affairs, 81 TEX. L. REV. 1
(2002) (examining the historical origins of the doctrine of “inherent powers” over
foreign affairs and the Supreme Court’s ultimate ratification of that doctrine in its latenineteenth-century decisions concerning Indians, aliens, and territories).
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distinct line of cases concerns U.S. courts evaluating foreign
sovereigns applying the outlier approach to the fruits of
extraterritorial searches, statements obtained during foreign
custodial interrogation, and other areas wherein foreign evidence is
introduced in domestic criminal proceedings.121
This foreign sovereign evaluation plays out in two different
doctrinal scenarios. First, there are the cases on the applicability of the
U.S. Constitution abroad, wherein courts engage in complex line
drawing to determine when constitutional rights apply to foreign
evidence and legal procedures. For instance, the Supreme Court has
created a test wherein constitutional and statutory protections do not
apply extraterritorially if such protection would be “impracticable and
anomalous.”122 Under this aforementioned test, constitutional
protections will turn on an analysis of the “practical concerns”
involved in applying the rights,123 rather than on straightforward
application of constitutional principles and precedent, as would be the
case in ordinary domestic prosecutions.124 The courts have similarly
created tests to determine who benefits from constitutional
protections. Under the prevailing view articulated in Boumediene, the
extraterritorial rights of both citizens and noncitizens vary from
location to location, and from circumstance to circumstance.125 For
non-citizens, the courts have sometimes determined that whether
they benefit from constitutional protections in U.S. courts depends on
the extent of their “voluntary connection[s]” to the United States.126

121. See, e.g., United States v. Emmanuel, 565 F.3d 1324, 1330 (11th Cir. 2009)
(“The general rule is that evidence obtained from searches carried out by foreign
officials in their own countries is admissible in United States courts, even if the search
would not otherwise comply with United States law or the law of the foreign
country. . . . But this Circuit has recognized . . . that evidence from foreign searches is
inadmissible if the conduct of the foreign officials during the search ‘shocks the judicial
conscience.’”).
122. See Boumediene, 553 U.S. at 759 (quoting Reid, 354 U.S. at 74–75 (Harlan, J.,
concurring)) (citing Verdugo-Urquidez, 494 U.S. at 277–78 (Kennedy, J., concurring)).
123. Id.
124. See, e.g., Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 20–30 (1968) (applying constitutional
principles and precedent to determine the reasonableness of search and seizure).
125. Boumediene, 553 U.S. at 766 (“[A]t least three factors are relevant in
determining the reach of the Suspension Clause: (1) the citizenship and status of the
detainee and the adequacy of the process through which that status determination was
made; (2) the nature of the sites where apprehension and then detention took place;
and (3) the practical obstacles inherent in resolving the prisoner’s entitlement to the
writ.”).
126. See Verdugo-Urquidez, 494 U.S. at 271; Rodriguez v. Swartz, 111 F. Supp. 3d
1025, 1036–37 (D. Ariz. 2015), vacated, 140 S. Ct. 1258 (2020).
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Even in cases where the Constitution does not apply abroad,
courts may still exclude evidence using the outlier approach. The
Fourth Amendment is the prime example here. Generally, U.S. courts
will admit evidence that foreign officials obtain from a search in their
own country, even when such search would not comply with U.S.
law.127 But when foreign law enforcement is operating entirely
independently in its criminal investigations, and thus the Fourth
Amendment does not apply, evidence gathered will still be excluded
when the foreign law enforcement methods “shock the conscience” of
the U.S. court.128 This discretion is rooted in federal courts’ inherent
“supervisory powers over the administration of federal justice,”129
and protects against foreign government conduct that “violates
fundamental international norms of decency.”130 This constitutes a
“high bar.”131 For instance, the Second Circuit has affirmed the
admission of evidence that may have been obtained by Israeli law
enforcement without a warrant under Israeli law.132 Or as another
127. United States v. Emmanuel, 565 F.3d 1324, 1330 (11th Cir. 2009); see also
Verdugo-Urquidez, 494 U.S. at 274 (adding the requirement that the Fourth
Amendment does not apply to searches/seizures of nonresident aliens located in a
foreign country). Is (non)compliance with foreign law considered when determining
reasonableness of foreign searches? The Ninth Circuit says yes; the Fifth, Seventh, and
Eleventh Circuits say no. Compare United States v. Peterson, 812 F.2d 486, 490 (5th
Cir. 1987) (holding that courts should address law of foreign country when assessing
reasonableness of foreign search), with Emmanuel, 565 F.3d at 1330 (holding that
evidence obtained from searches by foreign officials is generally admissible, even if the
search violated foreign law), United States v. Morrow, 537 F.2d 120, 140 (5th Cir.
1976) (refusing to hold that the Government must demonstrate that a search was legal
under the laws of a foreign country when it enters evidence gleaned from such a
search), and United States v. Stokes, 726 F.3d 880, 890 (7th Cir. 2013) (adopting the
language of Emmanuel, though also including Peterson in a string cite). An exception to
this rule is that the Fourth Amendment applies when the United States is in a “joint
venture” or when foreign authorities are acting as U.S. agents. See, e.g., United States v.
Abu Ali, 528 F.3d 210, 228 (4th Cir. 2008), cert. denied Ali v. United States, 555 U.S.
1170 (2009).
128. E.g., United States v. Maturo, 982 F.2d 57, 60–61 (2d Cir. 1992); United States
v. Nagelberg, 434 F.2d 585, 587 n.1 (2d Cir. 1970).
129. Emmanuel, 565 F.3d at 1330 (quoting Birdsell v. United States, 346 F.2d 775,
782 n.10 (5th Cir. 1965)) (citing United States v. Barona, 56 F.3d 1087, 1096 (9th Cir.
1995)).
130. United States v. Mitro, 880 F.2d 1480, 1483–84 (1st Cir. 1989) (quoting
Stephen A. Saltzburg, The Reach of the Bill of Rights Beyond the Terra Firma of the
United States, 20 VA. J. INT’L L. 741, 775 (1980)).
131. United States v. Knowles, No. CR 12-266, 2015 WL 10890271, at *4 (D.D.C.
Dec. 30, 2015) (“Though neither the Supreme Court nor the D.C. Circuit has articulated
a clear test to use to evaluate whether government conduct shocks the conscience, the
Supreme Court and other circuits emphasize the high bar such conduct must satisfy.”).
132. United States v. Getto, 729 F.3d 221, 229 (2d Cir. 2013).

274

MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW

[105:251

example, the Eleventh Circuit has found that lack of Bahamian judicial
review by a neutral magistrate over wiretaps did not shock the
conscience, given that fundamental international norms of decency do
not require in all jurisdictions such review over applications to
intercept wire communications.133
Fifth Amendment interrogation jurisprudence similarly
exemplifies the outlier approach. Interrogation abroad by foreign
authorities does not require Miranda warnings, given that the
Constitution cannot compel such foreign law enforcement conduct
and, furthermore, U.S. court exclusion has little deterrent effect on
foreign police practices.134 But if the U.S. government subsequently
moves to admit such statements into evidence in a domestic criminal
case, it must demonstrate that such statements were voluntary and
that the methods for obtaining such statements did not “shock the
conscience.”135 This “shocks the conscience” test derives from the Due
Process Clauses of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments,136 and
courts use it as a backstop to ensure that “decencies of civilized
conduct” are met even where the Constitution would not ordinarily
apply.137 For example, the Eleventh Circuit has found voluntary a
statement that Cambodian law enforcement elicited when the
defendant was interrogated for less than two hours, was offered food
and water, was not beaten or threatened, and was “treated with

133. Emmanuel, 565 F.3d at 1331 (“But it is clear enough that the conduct of the
Bahamian officials does not shock our conscience. Sergeant Woodside’s request for a
wiretap on Emmanuel’s telephones went through four levels of review and the request
had to be renewed every 14 days.”); see also United States v. Castrillon, No. S2 05 Cr.
156(CM), 2007 WL 2398810, at *3 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 15, 2007) (holding that “the conduct
identified by the defendants as conscience-shocking-that [sic] Colombian law does not
require a neutral and detached magistrate to review wiretap applications [or] a
showing of probable cause . . . falls far short of that standard”).
134. See, e.g., United States v. Frank, 599 F.3d 1221, 1228 (11th Cir. 2010); United
States v. Heller, 625 F.2d 594, 599 (5th Cir. 1980).
135. E.g., United States v. Allen, 864 F.3d 63, 82 (2d Cir. 2017) (noting that while
the Fourth Amendment prohibits unreasonable searches and seizures regardless of
whether the evidence is sought to be used in a criminal trial, a Fifth Amendment
violation may occur only if a statement is introduced at trial); Casey v. Dep’t of State,
980 F.2d 1472, 1477 (D.C. Cir. 1992) (showing “great deference” to Costa Rica’s
determination of extraditability in ruling against defendant who alleged that the State
Department misrepresented RICO charges as being drug charges, thereby subjecting
him to a Costa Rican treaty’s dual criminality provision, whereas RICO charges would
not have the same effect because Costa Rica did not have a RICO equivalent).
136. See Harbury v. Deutch, 233 F.3d 596, 602 (D.C. Cir. 2000); Rochin v. California,
342 U.S. 165, 172–73 (1952).
137. United States v. Abu Ali, 395 F. Supp. 2d 338, 380 (E.D. Va. 2005).
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respect.”138 Similarly, the Southern District of New York has found that
a statement given to Colombian law enforcement did not shock the
conscience when the defendant was first advised of his rights under
Colombian law—which included the right to remain silent and the
right to counsel—even though he did not appear to have waived such
rights and was neither informed that anything he said could be used
against him in a court of law, nor that an attorney would be appointed
for him if he could not afford one.139
These tests are ad hoc, fact-specific, and at times criticized. As
some scholars have noted, the meaning of “impracticable and
anomalous” is unclear.140 The U.S. District Court for the District of
Columbia has noted that “neither the Supreme Court nor the D.C.
Circuit has articulated a clear test . . . to evaluate whether [foreign]
government conduct shocks the conscience” in the Fourth
Amendment context.141 And some judges have criticized this approach
on the ground that it opens U.S. nationals up to the “vagaries” of
foreign criminal justice systems.142
2. Judgments Material to Sentencing
U.S. courts also use an outlier approach at sentencing, asking
whether a defendant’s prior conviction in a foreign country may be
used as a basis for upward departure of the U.S. sentence.143
At the federal level, although the U.S. Sentencing Guidelines
specify that foreign convictions may not be taken into account when
138. Frank, 599 F.3d at 1229.
139. United States v. Lopez-Imitola, No. 03 CR.294, 2004 WL 2534153, at *3
(S.D.N.Y. Nov. 9, 2004).
140. See Neuman, supra note 116, at 391–92.
141. United States v. Knowles, No. 12-266, 2015 WL 10890271, at *4 (D.D.C. Dec.
30, 2015).
142. See, e.g., United States v. Barona, 56 F.3d 1087, 1100 (9th Cir. 1995)
(Reinhardt, J., dissenting) (“[W]hat the majority holds is that the only Fourth
Amendment protections United States citizens who travel abroad enjoy vis-a-vis the
United States government are those safeguards, if any, afforded by the laws of the
foreign nations they visit.”). In Barona, the majority affirmed the admission of evidence
obtained in Denmark through a joint venture between Danish and U.S. authorities as
reasonable on the basis that all authorities fully complied with Danish law in their
investigation. Id. at 1096.
143. A departure allows sentencing courts to impose sentences outside or
otherwise different from the Commission’s guideline range, or—if the departure is
based on inadequate criminal history—to assign a different criminal history category,
allowing the court to impose a sentence outside the guideline range. OFF. OF GEN.
COUNS., U.S. SENT’G COMM’N, DEPARTURE AND VARIANCE PRIMER 1, 5 (2014), https://
www.ussc.gov/sites/default/files/pdf/training/primers/2014_Primer_Departure_Va
riance.pdf [https://perma.cc/3C5P-ABL8].
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computing a defendant’s criminal history, they expressly provide that
such convictions may be considered at sentencing “[i]f reliable
information indicates that the defendant’s criminal history category
substantially under-represents the seriousness of the defendant’s
criminal history or the likelihood that the defendant will commit other
crimes.”144 Among the states, considerable differences exist regarding
the extent to which foreign criminal judgments may be recognized,
particularly in the context of repeat offender statutes.145 Some state
courts have insisted that prosecutors demonstrate that the foreign
legal system in which a defendant was previously convicted is
“fundamentally fair,”146 but most have been willing to consider foreign
convictions when determining sentences without any such
requirement on the part of prosecutors.147
When the government moves for upward departure based on a
foreign conviction, courts virtually always reject defendant challenges
to such upward departure. The variation in the case law is how
specifically courts consider criminal procedural guarantees when
doing so. Some courts, in addressing the use of foreign criminal
convictions at sentencing, have rejected challenges to upward
departure without addressing any specific procedural rights.148 In
144. See U.S. SENT’G GUIDELINES MANUAL § 4A1.3 (U.S. SENT’G COMM’N 2018). Such
“information” includes “[p]rior sentence(s) not used in computing the criminal history
category (e.g., sentences for foreign and tribal convictions).” Id. § 4A1.3(a)(2)(A); see
also id. § 4A1.2(h) (“Sentences resulting from foreign convictions are not counted, but
may be considered under § 4A1.3 (Departures Based on Inadequacy of Criminal
History Category (Policy Statement)).”).
145. As of 1994, eight states expressly allowed for the consideration of foreign
judgments, twenty states disallowed it, and the remaining states had not clearly
decided the issue. See Alex Glashausser, Note, The Treatment of Foreign Country
Convictions as Predicates for Sentence Enhancement Under Recidivist Statutes, 44 DUKE
L.J. 134, 139 (1994).
146. See, e.g., People v. Wallach, 312 N.W.2d 387, 404 (Mich. Ct. App. 1981)
(holding that, before it could introduce evidence of a Canadian conviction for
impeachment purposes, the prosecution had the burden of showing that the Canadian
legal system was fundamentally fair), vacated on other grounds, 331 N.W.2d 730 (Mich.
1983).
147. See, e.g., United States v. Small, 183 F. Supp. 2d 755, 769 (W.D. Pa. 2002)
(noting that, regardless of their fairness, the procedures used by a foreign prosecutor
did not “cast any serious doubt on the accuracy of the fact-finding process”), aff’d, 333
F.3d 425 (3d Cir. 2003), rev’d on other grounds, 544 U.S. 385 (2005).
148. See, e.g., United States v. Fordham, 187 F.3d 344, 348 (3d Cir. 1999) (affirming
lower court’s determination that Mexican conviction was “fair” for purposes of upward
departure despite uncertainty regarding whether “Mexican authorities adhered to due
process in sentencing the defendant”); United States v. Soliman, 889 F.2d 441, 445 (2d
Cir. 1989) (affirming upward departure based on defendant’s previous Italian
conviction because trial judge was fully apprised of the “possible constitutional
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such cases, courts have even affirmed sentence enhancements based
on foreign convictions obtained through criminal proceedings starkly
different from those in the United States. In United States v. Ngombwa,
for example, the Eighth Circuit affirmed the U.S. District Court for the
Northern District of Iowa’s use of Rwandan “gacaca court” in absentia
convictions in its upward departure at sentencing, sidestepping the
defendant’s claims that such courts lack due process and procedural
rights.149 The district court found that, although such proceedings
“lacked certain rights” guaranteed domestically, expert testimony
regarding the various procedural protections that were in place
assured the court that such proceedings were “procedurally fair to
accused individuals,” using as indicia “a healthy ratio of acquittals to
convictions.”150 This is quite astounding, given the community-based
gacaca courts lack any right to counsel, the presumption of innocence
is pressured, and in many cases defendants learn of the nature of the
allegations against them only on the day of their trial.151 Indeed, the
United States lacks a formal extradition treaty with Rwanda.152 As will
be seen below, this suggests a lack of confidence in the country’s
criminal justice system.
Other courts may reference the “fundamental fairness” standard
derived from the Fourteenth Amendment’s due process clause.153 As
noted above, the “fundamental fairness” inquiry—by which courts
infirmities” of the foreign judgment); see also Brice v. Pickett, 515 F.2d 153, 154 (9th
Cir. 1975) (“Even if . . . [defendant] could prove that the foreign conviction was
obtained in proceedings which if conducted in this country would be violative of
United States constitutional guarantees, we find no requirement that a foreign court’s
proceedings or conviction must conform to United States constitutional standards.”).
149. 893 F.3d 546, 556 (8th Cir. 2018); see also United States v. Ngombwa, No. 14CR-123-LRR, 2017 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 17373, at *66 n.8 (N.D. Iowa Feb. 7, 2017).
150. Ngombwa, 2017 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 17373, at *66 n.8.; see also Maya Goldstein
Bolocan, Rwandan Gacaca: An Experiment in Transitional Justice, 2004 J. DISP. RESOL.
355, 381 (noting gacaca courts’ lack of competent judges, prosecutors, and defense
counsel).
151. See HUM. RTS. WATCH, JUSTICE COMPROMISED: THE LEGACY OF RWANDA’S
COMMUNITY-BASED GACACA COURTS 27–65 (2011) (reviewing gacaca procedure and
arguable violations of the right to counsel, presumption of innocence, right to be
informed of the case and to have time to prepare a defense, right to present a defense,
right to testify in one’s defense and the right against self-incrimination, protection
from double jeopardy, the right to be present at one’s own trial, and the right not to be
arbitrarily detained).
152. See 18 U.S.C. § 3181 (listing U.S. extradition treaty partners).
153. See, e.g., United States v. Wilson, 556 F.2d 1177, 1178 (4th Cir. 1977) (per
curiam) (“The only question here is whether the German legal system is so
fundamentally unfair that a conviction obtained under it is inadmissible. The
defendant has not shown that the German legal system lacks the procedural
protections necessary for fundamental fairness.”).
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evaluate whether a given criminal procedural rule is consistent with
due process—typically proceeds by considering whether the given
right is contrary to “a fundamental principle of liberty and justice
which inheres in the very idea of a free government and is the
inalienable right of a citizen of such a government.”154 For example, in
United States v. Kole, the Third Circuit held that a prior Philippine
conviction in which the defendant was denied the right to a jury trial
was nonetheless consistent with fundamental fairness, as the
Philippine court’s judgment reflected “the kind of careful, searching
analysis of evidence that one would expect . . . in the United States.”155
Applying the “fundamental fairness” standard derived from the
Fourteenth Amendment’s Due Process Clause, courts have typically
found upward departure appropriate in such cases.156 In general,
courts are most likely to affirm upward departure based on a foreign
conviction when presented with reliable information concerning the
defendant’s conduct that formed the basis of the foreign conviction.157
In terms of specific procedural rights, courts have considered foreign

154. See Twining v. New Jersey, 211 U.S. 78, 106 (1908), overruled on other grounds
by Malloy v. Hogan, 378 U.S. 1 (1964).
155. 164 F.3d 164, 175 (3d Cir. 1998).
156. See also United States v. McKeeve, 131 F.3d 1, 10 (1st Cir. 1997) (admitting
foreign-administered deposition that “did not comport in all respects with American
practice” under the former testimony hearsay exception of Federal Rules of Evidence
804(b)(1) on the basis that “the manner of examination required by the law of the host
nation . . . [was compatible] with our fundamental principles of fairness”). But see
United States v. Moskovits, 784 F. Supp. 183, 190 (E.D. Pa. 1991) (“[W]e cannot
countenance reliance on a foreign criminal conviction where it can be said, on the basis
of the record made, that there was a failure to provide for counsel at crucial stages of
the process.”).
157. In United States v. Delmarle, for instance, motivating the Second Circuit’s
affirmation of the use of an Italian in absentia conviction was a reliable record of the
conduct underlying the judgment. 99 F.3d 80, 85–86 (2d Cir. 1996) (“The events . . .
had been investigated by both an Italian agency and the United States Military Police.
The court considered the investigative report of the United States Military Police,
which was accompanied by extensive documentation . . . .” (internal quotations
omitted)); see also United States v. Ngombwa, No. 14-CR-123-LRR, 2017 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 17373, at *66 (N.D. Iowa Feb. 7, 2017) (“[T]he court finds that the eyewitness
reports of Defendant’s acts of violence—bolstered by his convictions in two separate
[Rwandan] courts—constitute ‘reliable information’ indicating that Defendant’s
classification in Criminal History Category I under-represents the severity of his
criminal history.”); United States v. Small, 183 F. Supp. 2d 755, 769 (W.D. Pa. 2002),
aff’d, 333 F.3d 425 (2003), rev’d, 544 U.S. 385 (2005) (“Although [violating defendant’s
right to remain silent] would be highly improper in a criminal prosecution in the
United States, we cannot say that the prosecutor’s actions cast any serious doubt on
the accuracy of the fact-finding process . . . .” (emphasis added)).
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convictions obtained without assistance of counsel,158 convictions
obtained without the right to a jury trial,159 and perhaps more
dramatically, convictions obtained in absentia.160
3. Extradition
Extradition is where the U.S. facilitation of foreign prosecutions
is at its apex. In this context, courts advance an outlier test when
evaluating foreign criminal justice systems, due in part to antecedent
political branch action.
The political branches are the first to engage in criminal
procedural line drawing when they negotiate bilateral extradition
treaties. Under Title 18 of the U.S. Code, such a treaty is necessary to
extradite a person out of the United States.161 The U.S. political
branches have thus concluded such bilateral extradition treaties with
dozens of other countries.162 In so doing, they act as criminal
procedural gatekeepers, assessing other countries’ criminal justice
systems before entering mutually binding international legal
obligations to extradite to and from that country. So, for example, the
United States has ratified extradition treaties with France and Japan,
but not with Russia or China.163
What exactly do the political branches assess in a potential
extradition treaty partner? Unfortunately, public statements in this
regard are quite sparse. To be sure, the branches do not require the
identical, finely-tuned constellation of U.S. rights. The majority of
treaty partners are civil law countries, meaning they are nonadversarial and thus procedurally distinct from common law
jurisdictions.164 Indeed, pursuant to these treaties, U.S. nationals may

158. United States v. Concha, 294 F.3d 1248, 1254–55 (10th Cir. 2002); Houle v.
United States, 493 F.2d 915, 915–16 (5th Cir. 1974) (per curiam).
159. Kole, 164 F.3d 164, 165–66 (3d Cir. 1998); Small, 183 F. Supp. 2d at 768.
160. Delmarle, 99 F.3d at 85–86; United States v. Fleishman, 684 F.2d 1329, 1345
(9th Cir. 1982), rev’d, United States v. Ibarra-Alcarez, 830 F.2d 968 (9th Cir. 1987).
161. See 18 U.S.C. § 3181(a) (“The provisions of this chapter relating to the
surrender of persons who have committed crimes in foreign countries shall continue
in force only during the existence of any treaty of extradition with such foreign
government.”). But see id. § 3184 (permitting the United States to extradite, without
regard to the existence of a treaty, non-U.S. persons who commit crimes of violence
against United States nationals in foreign countries).
162. Id. § 3181 (listing the countries with which the United States has extradition
agreements).
163. Id.
164. Compare id. (listing the countries with which the United States has extradition
agreements), with Field Listing: Legal Systems, CIA, https://www.cia.gov/library/
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be extradited to countries lacking a right to trial by jury,165 in which
defendants lack the same robust ability to confront witnesses,166
evidence may be admitted even though the underlying warrant was
issued on less than probable cause,167 or where hearsay evidence is
generally admitted in the investigating judge’s pre-trial dossier at the
outset of criminal proceedings.168 Even after conclusion of the
extradition treaty, executive branch extradition practice also
demonstrates some critical evaluation of foreign criminal procedure.
For example, many civil law countries convict in absentia, i.e., in
instances where a criminal defendant is at large and thus not
physically present at trial.169 For the U.S. executive branch, such a
conviction is a step too far: if a foreign country convicts a defendant in
absentia and such defendant is located in U.S. territory, the executive
will request—as a condition precedent to extradition—that the
individual be given a new trial upon return to that country.170
We might expect the judiciary to police the boundaries of such
executive action.171 But the U.S. judiciary has crafted a “rule of nonpublications/the-world-factbook/fields/308.html [https://perma.cc/U2TM-TZYS]
(listing all countries by legal systems).
165. See generally Valerie P. Hans, Jury Systems Around the World, 4 ANN. REV. L.
SOC. SCI. 275 (2008) (surveying the various forms of jury trial worldwide).
166. See Lorena Bachmaier, Rights and Methods to Challenge Evidence and
Witnesses in Civil Law Jurisdictions, in THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF CRIMINAL PROCESS 841,
853 (Darryl K. Brown, Jenia I. Turner & Bettina Weisser eds., 2019); see also Abraham
S. Goldstein & Martin Marcus, The Myth of Judicial Supervision in Three “Inquisitorial”
Systems: France, Italy, and Germany, 87 YALE L.J. 240, 242 n.7 (1977) (“Some have
suggested that the judge’s role in questioning the defendant and witnesses at trial is
the most distinctive feature of the [inquisitorial] system.”).
167. See Christopher Slobogin, An Empirically Based Comparison of American and
European Regulatory Approaches to Police Investigation, 22 MICH. J. INT’L L. 423, 426
(2001) (noting that England, France, and Germany issue warrants without requiring
probable cause and that European countries do not use exclusion as often to
counteract illegal searches and seizures).
168. See Goldstein, supra note 166 (“[T]he judge is expected to carry the factfinding
initiative at trial, using the file (dossier) prepared during the pretrial investigation by
an examining judge (or magistrate) or public prosecutor.”). See generally JOHN H.
LANGBEIN, COMPARATIVE CRIMINAL PROCEDURE: GERMANY (1977) (surveying the German
system of criminal procedure).
169. See Anne L. Quintal, Rule 61: The “Voice of the Victims” Screams out for Justice,
36 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 723, 739 (1998).
170. See, e.g., Leslie Anderson, Protecting the Rights of the Requested Person in
Extradition Proceedings: An Argument for a Humanitarian Exception, 4 MICH. J. INT’L L.
153, 155–56 (1983) (describing an instance where the United States requested a new
trial upon granting extradition).
171. See John Parry, The Lost History of International Extradition Litigation, 43 VA.
J. INT’L L. 93, 94–95 (2002) (“[A] citizen accused of crimes in another country might
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inquiry,” meaning courts will not look deeper into a foreign country’s
criminal process notwithstanding possible humanitarian concerns,
deferring instead to the executive’s evaluation pursuant to its Article
II power and the requirement of an extradition treaty pursuant to 18
U.S.C. § 3181(a).172 Courts also cite to the Secretary of State’s ultimate
discretion not to issue a surrender warrant in instances where the
fugitive has shown that he or she would be tortured or otherwise
denied the requisite process abroad.173 Whether explicitly or not,
courts assume that they are “bound by the existence of an extradition
treaty to assume that the trial will be fair.”174 On occasion, the
judiciary has recognized a limit to this deference. For example, the
Second Circuit has expressed “disquiet” over this doctrine,
recognizing possible “situations where [an extraditee] would be
subject to procedures or punishment so antipathetic to a federal
court’s sense of decency as to require reexamination. . . .”175 However,
courts rarely ever pierce this veil, typically opting to instead defer.176
seek comfort in the protections of due process . . . . [But the] extradition process does
not live up to such expectations . . . .”).
172. See, e.g., Hoxha v. Levi, 465 F.3d 554, 563 (3d Cir. 2006) (denying habeas relief
despite petitioner’s claims that he would be tortured if extradited because “such
humanitarian considerations are within the purview of the executive branch and
generally should not be addressed by the courts”).
173. See Lopez-Smith v. Hood, 121 F.3d 1322, 1327 (9th Cir. 1997) (“[U]nder what
is called the ‘rule of non-inquiry’ in extradition law, courts in this country refrain from
examining the penal systems of requesting nations, leaving to the Secretary of State
determinations of whether the defendant is likely to be treated humanely.”). As noted
above, such deference also implicates foreign substantive criminal law. Individuals
may also be extradited to other countries and prosecuted for crimes that would not
constitute criminal conduct within the United States. In re Extradition of Demjanjuk,
612 F. Supp. 544, 569 (N.D. Ohio 1985) (“If the extradition treaty so provides, the
United States may surrender a person to be prosecuted for acts which are not crimes
in the United States.”); Factor v. Laubenheimer, 290 U.S. 276, 293 (1933)
(“Considerations which should govern the diplomatic relations between nations . . .
require that their obligations should be liberally construed so as to effect the apparent
intention of the parties to secure equality and reciprocity between them.”).
174. Glucksman v. Henkel, 221 U.S. 508, 512 (1911).
175. Gallina v. Fraser, 278 F.2d 77, 79 (2d Cir. 1960) (“We can imagine situations
where the relator, upon extradition, would be subject to procedures or punishment so
antipathetic to a federal court’s sense of decency as to require reexamination of the
principle set out above.”).
176. Indeed, it appears that the few occasions where courts appeared to chip away
at the rule of non-inquiry have since been overruled. See, e.g., Cornejo-Barreto v.
Seifert, 218 F.3d 1004, 1007 (9th Cir. 2000) (concluding that an individual facing
extradition who claims he will be subjected to torture in the requesting country may,
under habeas corpus, petition for review of the Secretary of State’s decision to
extradite), overruled by Trinidad y Garcia v. Thomas 683 F.3d 952, 957 (9th Cir. 2012)
(en banc) (“The doctrine of separation of powers and the rule of non-inquiry block any
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Judicial reticence in this area may stem from the fact that the
United States’ duties to its own nationals in extraditions are unclear,
falling between the twin doctrinal pillars of domestic criminal
procedural violations and extradition prohibitions in cases of
torture.177 On one hand, any such foreign criminal process would
clearly violate constitutionally guaranteed procedural rights were it
to apply in a domestic U.S. case.178 On the other hand, the United States
has an absolute obligation not to extradite individuals to countries
where they will be tortured. The principle of non-refoulement
prohibits the expulsion of a refugee to a country where she may be
persecuted.179
Notably, several international instruments, including the
Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading
Treatment or Punishment (CAT), explicitly obligate states to abide by
inquiry into the substance of the Secretary[] [of State’s] declaration. To the extent that
we have previously implied greater judicial review of the substance of the Secretary’s
extradition decision other than compliance with her obligations under domestic law,
we overrule that precedent.” (citations omitted)); In re Burt, 737 F.2d 1477, 1484 (7th
Cir. 1984) (“[F]ederal courts undertaking habeas corpus review of extraditions have
the authority to consider the substantive conduct of the United States in undertaking
its decision to extradite if such conduct violates constitutional rights.”), partially
overruled by Venckiene v. United States, 929 F.3d 843, 860 (7th Cir. 2019).
177. To be clear, the preceding discussion should not be misunderstood as
suggesting that the executive branch enjoys unfettered discretion to extradite at will.
The judiciary does exercise authority over the executive branch in individual cases:
inter alia, it must certify that DOJ has probable cause that the fugitive has committed
the alleged crime abroad. See RONALD J. HEDGES, INTERNATIONAL EXTRADITION: A GUIDE
FOR JUDGES 10 (2014) (“[T]he central issue [is] whether there is competent evidence to
establish probable cause that the fugitive committed the offenses underlying the
request for extradition.”). But before any such case reaches such judicial review, the
political branches must have concluded a bilateral extradition treaty with the foreign
country. See 18 U.S.C. § 3181(a) (“The provisions of this chapter relating to the
surrender of persons who have committed crimes in foreign countries shall continue
in force only during the existence of any treaty of extradition with such foreign
government.”). And once the political branches reach such a conclusion, the judiciary
construes questions regarding foreign criminal process to be a foreign affairs matter.
178. And, of course, a foreign country’s arrest of a U.S. national present in a foreign
country would not explicitly trigger any U.S. duties to its nationals. See Arrest or
Detention of a U.S. Citizen Abroad, U.S. DEP’T STATE, https://travel.state.gov/content/
travel/en/international-travel/emergencies/arrest-detention.html [https://perma
.cc/S95L-VFZM] (explaining the limited services the U.S. government can provide to
arrested citizens).
179. The United States has, at times, nonetheless done so, depending upon
diplomatic assurances before transferring individuals to countries where they were
likely to be tortured. Jonathan Horowitz, Fatally Flawed Anti-Torture Assurances, JUST
SEC. (June 13, 2017), https://www.justsecurity.org/42009/fatally-flawed-anti
-torture-assurances [https://perma.cc/FL83-MXVF].
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this principle.180 Therefore, as party to the ICCPR and CAT, the United
States will not deport someone to a country where she will be
tortured, even giving that person asylum in certain cases.181 These
cases lie in the middle: state action clearly exists because the U.S.
government is physically taking custody of individuals and moving
them across borders, and yet the alleged violations of individual rights
abroad clearly do not implicate affirmative negative obligations on the
state, such as those mandated in the CAT.182
Finally, U.S. courts differ regarding the weight to be given to
foreign convictions in absentia when determining whether a foreign
state has demonstrated probable cause to arrest an individual within
the United States.183 Many U.S. courts have historically considered
such convictions merely as charges and therefore have required some
independent showing of probable cause.184 Other courts, particularly
in recent years, have held that convictions in absentia can conclusively

180. CAT, supra note 104, at 114; see The Principle of Non-Refoulment Under
International Human Rights Law, OFF. HIGH COMM’R FOR HUM. RTS., https://www
.ohchr.org/Documents/Issues/Migration/GlobalCompactMigration/ThePrincipleNon
-RefoulementUnderInternationalHumanRightsLaw.pdf [https://perma.cc/X8N3
-992S].
181. See ICCPR, supra note 96, at 175; CAT, supra note 103, at 114; see also Jeffrey
G. Johnston, The Risk of Torture as a Basis for Refusing Extradition and the Use of
Diplomatic Assurances to Protect Against Torture After 9/11, 11 INT’L CRIM. L. REV. 1, 5–
6 (2011) (noting that both the ICCPR and the CAT would be violated if a requested
country extradited a defendant to a country wherein they would be tortured). These
duties also stem from international legal obligations and the 1967 Protocol Relating to
the Status of Refugees. See Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees, Jan. 31, 1967,
19 U.S.T. 6223, 606 U.N.T.S. 267; Comm. Against Torture, General Comment No. 4
(2017) on the Implementation of Article 3 of the Convention in the Context of Article
22, ¶ 18, U.N. Doc. CAT/C/GC/4 (Sept. 4, 2018) (listing preventive measures to
guarantee the principle of non-refoulement).
182. As will be discussed in Part II, infra, this ambiguity underscores a broader lack
of theory regarding U.S. obligations—in criminal justice and more broadly—beyond
those encompassed in a social contract, citizenship-based conception of legal duties.
See Noah Feldman, Cosmopolitan Law?, 116 YALE L.J. 1022, 1050–52 (2007).
183. See generally Roberto Iraola, Foreign Extradition and in Absentia Convictions,
39 SETON HALL L. REV. 843 (2009).
184. See, e.g., Arambasic v. Ashcroft, 403 F. Supp. 2d 951, 962 (D.S.D. 2005);
Germany v. United States, No. 06-CV-01201, 2007 WL 2581894, at *7 (E.D.N.Y. Sept. 5,
2007); In re Extradition of Ernst, No. 97 CRIM.MISC.1 PG.22, 1998 WL 395267, at *7–
10 (S.D.N.Y. July 14, 1998) (finding probable cause to extradite lacking when
prosecution presented only the decision of a Swiss court, which failed to describe the
basis for its decision); see also Note, Foreign Trials in Absentia: Due Process Objections
to Unconditional Extradition, 13 STAN. L. REV. 370, 377 (1961) (“The established
practice in the United States and most other countries . . . is that a person convicted in
absentia is not treated as a person convicted, but as a person charged.”).

284

MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW

[105:251

establish probable cause.185 In any case, that a defendant was
convicted by a foreign country in absentia does not warrant a denial
of extradition, even when the defendant may not be afforded a new
trial by the requesting state, as is typically the case.186 In Gallina v.
Fraser, the defendant was found extraditable to Italy on the basis of
two in absentia convictions.187 In rejecting the defendant’s contention
that a finding of extraditability violated his due process rights because
he would be returned directly to prison without a trial, the Second
Circuit noted that it could find “no case authorizing a federal court, in
a habeas corpus proceeding challenging extradition from the United
States to a foreign nation, to inquire into the procedures which await
the [defendant] upon extradition.”188 The court further observed that
the case law holding that convictions in absentia should be treated as
a charge was “not to be construed as a statement that [a] federal court
may, as a condition for discharging the writ, require retrial in the
foreign country.”189
To sum up, pursuant to the outlier approach, courts deploy an ad
hoc, retrospective, generalized assessment of foreign criminal justice
systems. The courts have used a number of flexible tests when
evaluating criminal procedural rights both in the course of conviction
and in sentencing.190 On the one hand, every defendant is guaranteed
minimum standards of “civilized conduct,” regardless of whether
other constitutional provisions apply.191 On the other hand, the courts
185. See, e.g., United States v. Avdic, No. CR. 07-M06, 2007 WL 1875778, at *8
(D.S.D. June 28, 2007) (finding probable cause to extradite based on Bosnian
conviction in absentia when “an independent judicial officer in the requesting country
heard the evidence and found it sufficient to convict”); United States v. Bogue, No.
CRIM.A. 98-572-M, 1998 WL 966070, at *2 (E.D. Pa. Oct. 13, 1998) (“A determination
of the French government’s procedural fairness in undertaking the petitioner’s trial in
his absence . . . is beyond the scope of this Court’s review.”).
186. Iraola, supra note 183, at 857–58.
187. Gallina v. Fraser, 278 F.2d 77, 78 (2d Cir. 1960).
188. Id.
189. Id. at 78–79. What the case law stood for, according to the court, was merely
that an in absentia conviction does not preclude a district court from making an
independent probable cause determination as to whether the evidence presented
justifies a reasonable belief that the fugitive committed the crime for which extradition
is sought. See id. At the time Gallina was decided, in two of the seven reported cases
concerning extradition for defendants convicted in absentia, the courts discharged the
defendant, finding the evidence insufficient to support even an indictment. See Note,
supra note 184, at 377 n.31.
190. See supra Parts I.B.1–2.
191. See United States v. Abu Ali, 395 F. Supp. 2d 338, 380 (E.D. Va. 2005) (quoting
County of Sacramento v. Lewis, 523 U.S. 833, 846 (1998)); supra notes 18–19 and
accompanying text.
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exclude rights that are sufficiently “impracticable” and deny
protection to defendants lacking sufficient “connection” to the United
States.192 Each of these tests is highly fact-specific, and the Supreme
Court has not established a particular structure for courts to take in
their approach to these questions. Regarding foreign evidence—
including fruits of extraterritorial searches and foreign
interrogations193—evidence is admitted unless it falls under an
outlier test such as “shocking the judicial conscience.” When
considering foreign criminal judgments as a basis for upward
departure at sentencing, there are few, if any, procedural rights on
which U.S. courts insist a foreign conviction must safeguard.194 U.S.
courts have affirmed the use of foreign judgments that were obtained
without the right to counsel,195 the right against self-incrimination,196
and, most frequently, the right to a jury trial.197 Similarly, concerning
extradition, U.S. courts have found probable cause to extradite based
on foreign convictions obtained in absentia, even when no guarantees
exist that the convicted party will receive a new trial upon arrival to
the requesting country.198
192. See supra notes 122–29 and accompanying text.
193. See supra notes 135–40 and accompanying text.
194. On occasion, courts have refused to consider foreign convictions obtained
without the assistance of counsel. See, e.g., United States v. Moskovits, 784 F. Supp. 193
(E.D. Pa. 1992). However, such practice undoubtedly represents the exception, not the
rule. See United States v. Concha, 294 F.3d 1248, 1254 (10th Cir. 2002) (“[E]ven
assuming [the foreign convictions] are subject to challenge on Sixth Amendment
grounds, . . . it is proper to consider the underlying conduct in assessing the propriety
of an upward departure.”); Houle v. United States, 493 F.2d 915, 916 n.2 (5th Cir. 1974)
(“We decline to assume that [a conviction obtained without the assistance of counsel]
may be the basis for a judgment that a foreign system, utilizing procedures with which
we are unfamiliar, has failed to provide a fair trial if it does not conform with our rightto-counsel concepts.”); cf. United States v. Shavanaux, 647 F.3d 993, 997 (10th Cir.
2011) (affirming, for purposes of upward departure, sentencing judge’s consideration
of prior tribal convictions obtained without the assistance of counsel).
195. See Concha, 294 F.3d at 1254; United States v. Fleishman, 684 F.2d 1329, 1346
(9th Cir. 1982); Houle, 493 F.2d at 916 n.2.
196. See United States v. Small, 183 F. Supp. 2d 755, 769 (W.D. Pa. 2002)
(“Although [violating defendant’s right to remain silent] would be highly improper in
a criminal prosecution in the United States, we cannot say that the prosecutor’s
actions . . . rendered [the defendant’s] conviction unfair.”).
197. United States v. Kole, 164 F.3d 164, 175 (3d Cir. 1998); United States v.
Delmarle, 99 F.3d 80, 85–86 (2d Cir. 1996); United States v. Ngombwa, No. 14-CR-123LRR, 2017 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 17373, at *66 n.8 (N.D. Iowa Feb. 7, 2017); Small, 183 F.
Supp. 2d at 768.
198. Iraola, supra note 183, at 857–58; see, e.g., United States v. Avdic, No. CR. 07M06, 2007 WL 1875778, at *8 (D.S.D. June 28, 2007) (finding probable cause to
extradite based on Bosnian conviction in absentia when “an independent judicial
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C. ASSESSING AND EXPLAINING THE TWO APPROACHES
How may we explain and assess the two approaches described
above? On its own terms, the core criminal procedure approach
coheres. The U.S. Supreme Court has the greatest interest in
preserving process domestically; the Court both decides which Bill of
Rights guarantees apply to the states and what form they should take
in such prosecutions.199 The political branches then have the next
highest concern in the negotiation and ratification of human rights
treaties that apply both abroad and at home.200 And finally, the United
States has established the most narrow minimum core in instances
where a mutuality of agreement exists but the normative concerns are
at their lowest, either because the instrument is not legally binding (in
the case of the UDHR)201 or because the guarantees concern foreign
jurisdictions prosecuting foreign nationals (in the case of the CLOUD
Act).
Similarly, the outlier approach makes some intuitive sense on its
own terms. Foreign jurisdictions are permitted a robust set of criminal
procedures—even those procedures that will influence domestic
criminal prosecutions—as long as there is no flagrant activity on the
part of U.S. law enforcement and/or in the structure of that foreign
legal system.202 And extradition is driven by political branch treaty
making, in particular executive branch foreign affairs expertise; the
judiciary then defers because the political branches have “cleared the
space” with formal law enforcement agreements.203
But combined, these two approaches are nonsensical. The
clearest example of such doctrinal incoherence is that of the CLOUD
Act, which draws procedural lines to include greater explicit
protections for foreign nationals prosecuted in foreign countries than
officer in the requesting country heard the evidence and found it sufficient to convict”);
United States v. Bogue, No. CRIM.A. 98-572-M, 1998 WL 966070, at *2 (E.D. Pa. Oct. 13,
1998) (“A determination of the French government’s procedural fairness in
undertaking the petitioner’s trial in his absence . . . is beyond the scope of this Court’s
review.”). But see In re Extradition of Ernst, No. 97 CRIM.MISC.1 PG.22, 1998 WL
395267, at *7–10 (S.D.N.Y. July 14, 1998) (finding probable cause to extradite lacking
when prosecution presented only decision of a Swiss court, which failed to describe
the basis for its decision).
199. See supra Part I.A. As discussed in Part II.A, infra, this differentiation is also
consistent with Rawlsian second and third original positions, as well as the rights
flowing from them.
200. See supra Part I.A.
201. See supra note 95.
202. See supra Part I.B.
203. See supra Part I.B.
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it does U.S. nationals prosecuted abroad or, in some instances, even
domestically.204 First, the CLOUD Act excludes U.S. nationals, so by
definition foreign countries are advancing investigations into their
own or other nationals; this presumably gives the United States a
lower stake in the process. Second, in contrast to extraditions, where
a foreign government has already indicted an individual, CLOUD Act
cases apply to investigations, which almost always arise preindictment.205 There is thus less immediate risk of a flagrant due
process or human rights violation, though of course such an
investigation may lead to prosecution and incarceration. In other
words, the Act saliently provides guidance regarding fundamental
fairness when foreign sovereigns are obtaining evidence in the United
States, and yet little-to-no guidance exists for concluding extradition
treaties or articulating an “outlier test” due process analysis.206 Such
explicit guidance on core criminal procedure—more than in other
contexts—is surprising because the U.S. government has less of a
stake in these cases.
Another example of such doctrinal incoherence is the treatment
of foreign convictions in absentia.207 U.S. courts disfavor such
convictions as a basis for extradition abroad, where constitutional
criminal procedural rights otherwise have little applicability.208 And
yet domestically, such convictions may be the basis for upward
departure for sentences.209 This is surprising because the U.S. criminal
justice system should presumably have more of a stake in the
administration of its own sentences than it does in prosecutions
abroad.
Why such doctrinal incoherence? The answer lies in the historical
development of four distinct legal movements—incorporation,
human rights codification, judicial rulings on constitutional
extraterritoriality, and internationalization of criminal law
enforcement—each coming online at various points in the twentieth
century. First, judicial rulings on extraterritoriality are of oldest
vintage and are internally incoherent; for example, the Insular Cases,
Reid v. Covert and Verdugo-Urquidez, exemplify constitutional
extraterritoriality doctrine decided in the nineteenth century and

204.
205.
206.
207.
208.
209.

See supra Part I.A.3.
See supra Part I.A.3.
See supra Part I.A.3.
See supra Part I.B.
See supra Part I.B.3.
See supra Part I.B.2.
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then fractured in the twentieth century.210 Second, the human rights
movement began in the 1940s with the negotiation of the UDHR and
subsequent international human rights instruments, though the
United States has been slow to ratify many of these treaties since that
time.211 Third, incorporation of the U.S. Bill of Rights did not occur
until the Warren Court “revolution,” beginning in earnest in the
1960s.212 And finally, law-enforcement activity abroad has grown
aggressively in the last twenty years.213
These successive and overlapping legal regimes have led to a lag
in the articulation and implementation of criminal procedural norms
over time. When the United States was pushing for certain rights to be
included in international human rights treaties, many of these rights
had not been incorporated in the fifty U.S. states.214 Similarly, when
the U.S. courts were ruling on applicability of the U.S. Constitution
abroad, they were doing so in a pre-incorporation era and, mostly, in
a pre-human rights era.215 And from a broader transnational legal
process perspective, many of these crosscurrents are interrelated. For
example, the international human rights movement derives in large
part from American influence on the instruments, and the American
influence is largely rooted in the United States Constitution.216 As
such, many of these concepts were “uploaded” from U.S. law to
international human rights law, and then “downloaded” to many other
countries pursuant to transnational legal process.217 And yet, in the
210. See supra Part I.B.1.
211. See supra Part I.A.2.
212. See supra Part I.A.1.
213. In criminal procedure in particular, the rise of law enforcement abroad
corresponded with the “constitutionalization” of the Bill of Rights during the Warren
Court era; reconciling these trends has been an enduring challenge for the federal
courts. RAUSTIALA, supra note 19, at 184 (“[T]he criminal procedure revolution of the
1960s . . . created a host of legal protections for suspects that fit awkwardly with
overseas policing efforts.”).
214. See supra Part I.A.2.
215. See supra Part I.A.1. This is similar to Kal Raustiala’s point that various forms
of constitutional extraterritoriality and intra-territoriality exist concurrently and
incoherently today due to their different legal geneses at various points in our history.
See RAUSTIALA, supra note 19, at 7.
216. David S. Law & Mila Versteeg, The Declining Influence of the United States
Constitution, 87 N.Y.U. L. REV. 762, 764–66 (2012) (discussing the one-time influence
of the U.S. Constitution on constitutionalism and human rights abroad).
217. See Harold Hongju Koh, Twenty-First-Century International Lawmaking, 101
GEO. L.J. 725, 747 (2013) (“Twenty-first-century international lawmaking has become
a swirling interactive process whereby norms get ‘uploaded’ from one country into the
international system and then ‘downloaded’ elsewhere into another country’s laws or
even a private actor’s internal rules.”).
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United States, this download has ironically stalled out in transnational
criminal law enforcement.
These successive and overlapping legal regimes have led to
confusion in the lower courts.218 The best example of this has been the
Hernandez case, which has had a long history both in the Fifth Circuit
and in the Supreme Court.219 The 2010 case involved a U.S. Border
Patrol agent, standing in the United States, killing a Mexican citizen,
Sergio Adrian Hernandez Guereca (“Hernandez”), standing in
Mexico.220 Hernandez’s parents subsequently brought a variety of
claims against the agent and the United States, including claims under
Bivens and the Alien Tort Statute, that turned on the question of
whether the U.S. Constitution applied extraterritorially to Mexico.221
As part of this litigation, the courts struggled with how to reconcile the
“voluntary connections” test with the “impracticable and anomalous”
test.222
218. See, e.g., Ibrahim v. Dep’t of Homeland Sec., 669 F.3d 983, 997 (9th Cir. 2012)
(“The law that we are bound to follow is, instead, the ‘functional approach’ of
Boumediene and the ‘significant voluntary connection’ test of Verdugo–Urquidez.”);
Rodriguez v. Swartz, 111 F. Supp. 3d 1025, 1035 (D. Ariz. 2015) (“In sum, this Court
finds most appropriate to apply the ‘practical considerations’ outlined in Boumediene
in conjunction with Verdugo–Urquidez’ ‘voluntary connections’ test to evaluate
whether J.A. was protected by the Fourth Amendment.”); Al Bahlul v. United States,
767 F.3d 1, 31–33 (D.C. Cir. 2014) (Henderson, J., concurring) (reconciling the
overlapping doctrine to determine extraterritorial applicability of the Fifth
Amendment).
219. Hernandez v. United States, 802 F. Supp. 2d 834, 846 (W.D. Tex. 2011)
(granting the government’s motion to dismiss in its entirety), aff’d in part, rev’d in part,
757 F.3d 249, 280 (5th Cir. 2014) (holding that while the United States had not waived
sovereign immunity for any of the claims brought against it, appellants were able to
bring forth a Fifth Amendment claim against Agent Mesa and had asserted sufficient
facts to overcome qualified immunity), aff’d on reh’g en banc per curiam, 785 F.3d 117,
119 (5th Cir. 2015) (determining that plaintiffs failed to assert a breach of the Fourth
Amendment, and that Agent Mesa was entitled to qualified immunity from the Fifth
Amendment excessive-force claim), cert. granted sub nom. Hernandez v. Mesa, 137 S.
Ct. 291 (2016), vacated per curiam, 137 S. Ct. 2003, 2007–08 (2017) (holding that the
court of appeals erred in granting qualified immunity to Agent Mesa). On remand, the
Fifth Circuit, sitting en banc, affirmed the district court’s earlier decision to dismiss
plaintiffs’ claims against the government and Agent Mesa. Hernandez v. Mesa, 885 F.3d
811 (5th Cir. 2018) (en banc), cert. granted in part, 139 S. Ct. 2636 (2019), aff’d, 140 S.
Ct. 735, 739, 744, 750 (2020) (declining to extend Bivens to the “new context” of a claim
arising out of a cross-border shooting); cf. United States v. Allen, 864 F.3d 63, 68 (2d
Cir. 2017) (“[T]he Fifth Amendment’s prohibition on the use of compelled testimony
in American criminal proceedings applies even when a foreign sovereign has
compelled the testimony.”).
220. Hernandez v. United States, 757 F.3d at 255.
221. Id.
222. See id. at 265 (“While the Boumediene Court appears to repudiate the
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It is time to clear up this confusion and resolve the lag in
articulation of criminal procedural norms. Core criminal procedure is
the superior approach because it is most consistent with domestic and
international legal obligations in a time of increasing law enforcement
cooperation. It thus affirms defendants’ individual rights—rights
which affirm individual dignity, mandate necessary process, and
delineate the limits of government authority—at a time where they
are most vulnerable in the face of not one, but multiple sovereigns
advancing their prosecution. The following Parts will build the
normative case for core criminal procedure, provide a methodology
for its application, and show its utility in engaging with the broader
system of international criminal law.
II. TOWARDS A NEW FRAMEWORK FOR CORE CRIMINAL
PROCEDURE
How should the U.S. government engage in criminal procedural
line drawing? This Part builds a normative foundation for core
criminal procedure. It first theorizes such core, using constitutional
and global justice theory. It then argues for a tripartite framework—
rooted in constitutional incorporation, international human rights
obligations, and comparative functionalism—for the judiciary and
political branches to employ when engaging in cross-sovereign line
drawing. Finally, it prescribes the role each of the three branches of
government should play in applying this standard to foreign criminal
justice systems.
A. THEORIZING THE CORE
What should be the inviolable inner core of criminal procedure?
What is the obligation of any state to provide such process to its own
nationals and to other nationals? Does that obligation extend only to
formalistic reasoning of Verdugo-Urquidez’s sufficient connections test, courts have
continued to rely on the sufficient connections test and its related interpretation of the
Fourth Amendment text.”); Hernandez v. United States, 785 F.3d at 136 (Prado, J.,
concurring) (“Citing Eisentrager and Verdugo-Urquidez, the concurrence asserts that
the Supreme Court has foreclosed the question before our Court. This uncomplicated
view of extraterritoriality fails to exhibit due regard for the Court’s watershed opinion
in Boumediene, which not only authoritatively interpreted these earlier cases but also
announced the bedrock standards for determining the extraterritorial reach of the
Constitution . . . .”); Hernandez v. Mesa, 137 S. Ct. at 2011 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (“These
six sets of considerations taken together provide more than enough reason for treating
the entire culvert as having sufficient involvement with, and connection to, the United
States to subject the culvert to Fourth Amendment protections. I would consequently
conclude that the Fourth Amendment applies.”).
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cases where the U.S. government is itself prosecuting individuals, or
does U.S. involvement in foreign prosecutions trigger certain criminal
procedural and/or constitutional obligations? From these
fundamental questions emerges an obvious tension, one scholars
often overlook: either way, cross-border law enforcement
cooperation opens the United States to both praise and criticism. On
one hand, arguments for the status quo favor broad law enforcement
cooperation and thus promotion of criminal accountability and
security—but open the United States to accusations of brutal realism
that overrides individual rights and sucks individuals worldwide into
its expansive criminal justice system. Conversely, prescribing a
rigorous rights framework could promote the United States as
laudable arbiter of individual rights, but opens it to charges of both
cultural imperialism and reluctance to assist other countries in critical
law enforcement goals. As a general rule, a greater insistence on
criminal procedural rights will lead to decreasing law-enforcement
cooperation—at the extreme, insisting on the identical criminal
procedural rights as in the United States would lead to the total
cessation of any such cooperation.223
One starting point to resolve this tension is to affirm its
contemporary inevitability. International cooperation in law
enforcement constitutes a consequential, necessary shift in U.S.
criminal justice. Such cross-border cooperation addresses one of the
central concerns of international criminal law: that global crime
metastasizes more rapidly than any domestic or international
institution can legally adapt to promote criminal accountability,
creating impunity gaps.224 While this cross-border crime may be
traced to piracy in the earliest days of the U.S. republic or the rise of
drug trafficking in the 1970s, the accelerating rate of movement of
people and information across borders has catalyzed a new era of
global crime.225 The U.S. government knows that while its borders
223. This balance adds a transnational twist to the classic dichotomy between
crime control values—emphasizing efficiency, speed, finality, and other characteristics
that serve the repression of criminal conduct—and due process—focusing on formal,
adjudicative, adversarial processes that instantiate formidable “obstacle course”
impediments to carrying an accused further along in the criminal process—first
outlined by Herbert Packer in 1964. Herbert L. Packer, Two Models of the Criminal
Process, 113 U. PA. L. REV. 1, 9–23 (1964).
224. See Koh, supra note 12, at 352; Tuerkheimer, supra note 16, at 308–14.
225. See Koh, supra note 12, at 351–52; Tuerkheimer, supra note 16, at 309 (“An
earlier example of ‘global crime’ might have been the importation of heroin from Italy
to the United States. Today’s criminal efforts totally eclipse such earlier ‘global’
criminal ventures.”).
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delimit the geographical boundaries of its enforcement jurisdiction,
criminality increasingly transcends such borders.226 As the FIFA and
Charles “Chuckie” Taylor, Jr. cases demonstrate, these borders now
represent an advantage for criminals, who exploit “national
sanctuaries” to live in impunity.227 In light of this, the question is not
whether, but how to best draw cross-border criminal procedural lines
in this contemporary space.228
1. Beyond the Social Contract
At first blush, constitutional doctrine and theory could provide a
framework for theorizing core criminal procedure, given the long
history
of
complex
questions
regarding
constitutional
extraterritoriality and scholarship relating to it. Indeed, debates about
constitutional extraterritorial applicability have long turned on
shifting accounts of when, where, and to whom the U.S. Constitution
applies abroad.229 As Gerald Neuman has noted, “[t]o resolve the
question of the proper scope of the individual rights provisions of the
United States Constitution, it is useful to ask what rights in a
226. See Koh, supra note 12 (discussing the proliferation of U.S. foreign affairs
prosecutions).
227. Id. at 352–55 (discussing both the 2015 arrest of seven senior FIFA officials
and the 2008 conviction of Charles “Chuckie” Taylor, Jr.—son of former Liberian
President Charles Taylor—for perpetuating torture while serving as head of the
Liberian Anti-Terrorism Unit from 1999 to 2002).
228. In other words, when courts are engaging in “impracticable and anomalous”
analysis, “impracticable” does not equal unbridled pragmatism or outlier pragmatism
rooted in only the most flagrant foreign procedural conduct. Instead, this Article calls
for a principled pragmatism, one that equals fundamental rights, rights informed by
constitutional, human rights, and functionalist analysis. This Part structures this
analysis.
229. See RAUSTIALA, supra note 19, at 7. A central tension in these cases has been
between a territorial conception of U.S. criminal procedural rights—i.e., wherein
constitutional guarantees stop “at the water’s edge”—and a conception wherein the
Constitution applies more robustly to aliens and to U.S. nationals in foreign territories.
Id. at 185–86. For example, Reid v. Covert, decided in 1957, likely indicates the highwater mark for the extraterritorial application of constitutional criminal procedural
rights. 354 U.S. 1 (1957). Writing for a four-justice plurality, Justice Black declared that
whenever the United States acts against its citizens abroad, it may do so only in
conformity with the Bill of Rights. Id. at 5–6. Half a century earlier, by contrast, the
Court held in Neely v. Henkel that the Bill of Rights retains no force abroad, even for
U.S. citizens. 180 U.S. 109, 122–23 (1901). Between these two extremes, perhaps, lies
Justice Edward Douglass White’s concurring opinion in Downes v. Bidwell. 182 U.S. 244,
287 (1901) (White, J., concurring). In its articulation of the doctrine of “territorial
incorporation,” Justice White’s concurrence suggests that even territories
unincorporated by the United States may benefit from “inherent . . . principles . . . of . . .
free government.” Id. at 291.
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constitution are for, and in particular what United States
constitutional rights are for.”230 In 1991, at the time of Neuman’s
writing, that was a pressing question in the space of the
extraterritorial enforcement of constitutional rights and one that he
resolved through a social contract framework.231
However, the Constitution is undertheorized at the edges of its
extraterritorial applicability, and beyond that line there is virtually no
guidance on how courts should evaluate criminal procedure. As Noah
Feldman has noted, social contract theories are so co-extensive with
the design of nation states that they provide no guidance about how
to do justice to those falling outside the basic requirements of equal
citizenship.232 For example, as described above, per Verdugo-Urquidez
and Boumediene, the Constitution will not apply abroad when it would
be “impracticable and anomalous” to do so.233 As Neuman has noted,
the meaning of this phrase is unclear, though the former term may
mean compliance is impossible or imposes great costs in foreign
territory, while the latter could indicate cultural incongruity with
customs in a foreign legal system.234 And even in cases where foreign
law enforcement is operating entirely independently in its criminal
investigations and thus the Constitution does not apply, evidence
gathered will still be excluded when foreign law enforcement methods
“shock the conscience” of the court.235 This discretion is rooted in

230. Gerald L. Neuman, Whose Constitution?, 100 YALE L.J. 909, 976 (1991); see id.
at 917 (“Social contract rhetoric has played a significant role in American
constitutionalism. . . . A skeptic who did not ascribe normative force to social contract
arguments still could invoke the idea of a social contract as a historically-grounded tool
for interpreting American constitutionalism. This sort of reasoning is evident in Chief
Justice Rehnquist’s opinion in Verdugo-Urquidez.”). But see David M. Golove & Daniel J.
Hulsebosch, A Civilized Nation: The Early American Constitution, the Law of Nations, and
the Pursuit of International Recognition, 85 N.Y.U. L. REV. 932, 1065 (2010) (arguing
that the drafting and adoption of the U.S. Constitution was in fact an international
affair).
231. See Neuman, supra note 230, at 919.
232. Feldman, supra note 182, at 1034 (citing MARTHA C. NUSSBAUM, FRONTIERS OF
JUSTICE: DISABILITY, NATIONALITY, SPECIES MEMBERSHIP (2006)).
233. United States v. Verdugo-Urquidez, 494 U.S. 259, 277–78 (1990) (Kennedy, J.,
concurring); Boumediene v. Bush, 553 U.S. 723, 770 (2008).
234. Neuman, supra note 116, at 391–93 (drawing on Justice Harlan’s opinion in
Reid v. Covert, 354 U.S. 1 (1957)).
235. See, e.g., United States v. Maturo, 982 F.2d 57, 60–61 (2d Cir. 1992); United
States v. Nagelberg, 434 F.2d 585, 587 n.1 (2d Cir. 1970).
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federal courts’ inherent “supervisory powers over the administration
of federal justice.”236
Furthermore, a focus on traditional constitutional norms risks
overlooking the international human rights obligations that govern
even in the absence of formal constitutional applicability. Often such
rights are thought irrelevant once the constitutional inquiry ends;
such ambiguity and oversight is reminiscent of debates regarding
rights in the War on Terror.237 In areas where the U.S. Constitution
does not apply, does “anything go”?238 Of course, from the perspective
of the first legal movement of Insular constitutional extraterritoriality
cases described in Part I.C, the answer could be “yes, anything goes”
or “yes, though some limited rights apply.” But this answer is of course
outdated in the twenty-first century: the structure of international
human rights norms now includes virtually all countries of the world,
cohering around certain baseline rules and standards that ground
equal treatment of individuals, regardless of nationality. For the
United States, this means especially the ICCPR, and the UDHR.239 This
236. United States v. Emmanuel, 565 F.3d 1324, 1330 (11th Cir. 2009) (citing
Birdsell v. United States, 346 F.2d 775, 782 n.10 (5th Cir. 1965); United States v.
Barona, 56 F.3d 1087, 1091 (9th Cir. 1995)).
237. See, e.g., Oona A. Hathaway et al., Human Rights Abroad: When Do Human
Rights Treaty Obligations Apply Extraterritorially, 43 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 389 (2011)
(surveying foreign and international tribunals’ approach to extraterritorial application
of human rights treaties); see also Young, supra note 25, at 123–24 (noting that
constitutional courts worldwide have not grasped economic and social rights
protections in various national constitutional contexts).
238. See TINA M. FIELDING FRYLING, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW IN CRIMINAL JUSTICE 150–51
(2014).
239. Gerald Neuman has called this the multiple positivisation of human rights, or
“the creation of different legal regimes at the national and transnational level for the
protection of individual rights, and the resulting problem of how these regimes
compete or co-operate or can be reconciled with one another.” Gerald L. Neuman,
Human Rights and Constitutions in a Complex World, 50 IRISH JURIST 1, 1 (2013); see also
Gerald L. Neuman, Human Rights and Constitutional Rights: Harmony and Dissonance,
55 STAN. L. REV. 1863, 1874 (2003) (“The consensual and suprapositive aspects of
fundamental rights each create potential for conflicting claims of legitimacy and
authority between the national constitutional system and the international human
rights system.”); United States Ratification of International Human Rights Treaties, HUM.
RTS. WATCH (July 24, 2009), https://www.hrw.org/news/2009/07/24/united-states
-ratification-international-human-rights-treaties [https://perma.cc/Z7XS-Z9YZ]
(noting that the United States is party to numerous human rights treaties, including
the ICCPR and the CAT). Most countries in the world are also bound by the
International Covenant on Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights; the Convention on
the Rights of the Child; and the Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities.
International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, Dec. 16, 1966, 993
U.N.T.S. 3; Convention on the Rights of the Child, Nov. 20, 1989, 1577 U.N.T.S. 3; G.A.
Res. 61/106, Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities (Jan. 24, 2007); see
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tension is salient in cases regarding the war on terror; in criminal
justice, this tension is heretofore less visible.
2. Global Justice Theory
Global justice theory can help to update our constitutional
conception, highlighting how constitutional law interlocks with
international human rights and comparative law. While U.S. criminal
justice has traditionally unfolded only on a domestically focused
paradigm, similarly “the history of political philosophy has been
marked by an interest in domestic justice within the state.”240 But
global justice theory is responsive to the contemporary transnational
criminal justice questions arising between states.241
Returning to the original question: in this contemporary era,
what are rights for? To whom do we guarantee criminal procedural
rights, where, and when? And—just as crucially—what amount of
process is required in this space? In one conception, attributed
originally to Thomas Hobbes and to contemporary scholars in the
nationalism school, the absence of a world judicial body means that
anarchy, without justice, characterizes international affairs.242 In
another conception, rooted in Immanuel Kant’s On Perpetual Peace,
democratic states promote a peaceful world order, even in the
absence of a higher world government.243 John Rawls’ contribution
extends this beyond merely democratic nations to “decent peoples”
that, though not democratic, respect the rule of law and permit
dissent.244 In his conception, a cosmopolitan, peaceful world means
also United States Ratification of International Human Rights Treaties, supra note 239
(noting that the United States has refrained from ratifying any international human
rights treaties since December 2002).
240. Thom Brooks, Introduction to THE GLOBAL JUSTICE READER xii (Thom Brooks
ed., 2008); Feldman, supra note 182, at 1025 (“Traditional liberal conceptions of law
tend to hold that law, properly so called, can only exist and justifiably coerce people
when it emanates from some political association such as a state, a treaty regime, or
the international community . . . . But perhaps there are other ways for binding law to
come into existence.”).
241. Frank J. Garcia, Three Takes on Global Justice, 31 U. LA VERNE L. REV. 323, 325
(2009) (“When we speak of global justice we are arguing, in effect, that globalization
is creating social outcomes and processes . . . that make justice relevant at the global
level, and that we need to consider whether these outcomes and processes are indeed
acceptable in terms of core principles.”).
242. Brooks, supra note 240, at xv; see THOMAS HOBBES, THE ELEMENTS OF LAW,
NATURAL AND POLITIC 182 (J.C.A. Gaskin ed., Oxford Univ. Press 1994) (1650) (“For that
which is the law of nature between man and man, before the constitution of
commonwealth, is the law of nations between sovereign and sovereign, after.”).
243. Brooks, supra note 240, at xvi.
244. Id. at xvi.
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“respecting the right of different peoples to establish varying political
constitutions within certain safeguards.”245 This helps to frame
questions regarding the duties—including the criminal procedural
duties—that states owe to foreign nationals. From a Hobbesian
nationalist viewpoint, a state owes no duties to those beyond its
borders.246 To the Kantian, the individual—not the state—is the
highest unit of moral concern and thus entitled to equal respect,
regardless of citizenship status.247 From this cosmopolitan vantage
point, the question becomes what practical steps a country should
take in order to satisfy those duties.248
Rawls and another theorist in this tradition—Charles Beitz—
provide particular guidance here. To start, Rawls’s Law of Peoples
distinguishes between rights guaranteed domestically and those
guaranteed between peoples of different nations.249 He makes the
distinction between reasonable pluralism of comprehensive doctrines
within a constitutional democracy and an even greater diversity
among decent peoples with many different cultures and traditions.250
Despite such variety, however, free and democratic peoples will agree
245. Id. (emphasis added); see GILLIAN BROCK, GLOBAL JUSTICE: A COSMOPOLITAN
ACCOUNT 3 (2009) (“On one common account of cosmopolitanism, the key idea is that
every person has global stature as the ultimate unit of moral concern and is therefore
entitled to equal respect and consideration no matter what her citizenship status or
other affiliations happen to be.”).
246. Feldman, supra note 182, at 1028 (“[P]olitical theory since Thomas Hobbes’s
Leviathan has focused largely on the functioning of states.”); Brooks, supra note 240,
at xvi.
247. BROCK, supra note 245; Brooks, supra note 240, at xvi.
248. Brooks, supra note 240, at xix; BROCK, supra note 245 (“What policies should
a cosmopolitan support in the world we live in today?”). See generally SAMUEL MOYN,
NOT ENOUGH: HUMAN RIGHTS IN AN UNEQUAL WORLD 146–72 (2018) (discussing the rise
of global justice theory in the 1970s and 1980s); KWAME ANTHONY APPIAH,
COSMOPOLITANISM: ETHICS IN A WORLD OF STRANGERS 151 (2006) (“[C]osmopolitanism is
. . . universality plus difference . . . .”).
249. John Rawls, The Law of Peoples, in THE GLOBAL JUSTICE READER, supra note 240,
at 218, 230 (“The parties’ first task in the second original position is to specify the Law
of Peoples—its ideals, principles, and standards—and how those norms apply to
political relations among peoples.”). Since its publication, The Law of Peoples has been
heavily criticized on a variety of fronts. See, e.g., Seyla Benhabib, The Law of Peoples,
Distributive Justice, and Migrations, 72 FORDHAM L. REV. 1761, 1761 (2004) (arguing
that Rawls’s emphasis on political communities and the modern nation-state
abandoned the Kantian framework of liberal cosmopolitanism); Charles R. Beitz,
Rawls’s Law of Peoples, 110 ETHICS 669, 669–96 (2000); Thomas W. Pogge, Moral
Universalism and Global Economic Justice, 1 POL. PHIL. & ECON. 29, 29–58 (2002).
250. BROCK, supra note 245, at 12–13 (acknowledging that moderate
cosmopolitanism recognizes a distinction between norms of justice that apply within
an individual society and those that apply to a global population at large).
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on certain principles of justice, including that they are to “honor
human rights.”251 While the specific rights on which Rawls insists is a
source of debate,252 Rawls justifies the core criminal procedure
approach to fundamental rights, given that the U.S. federal
government has twice made these distinctions—first as a federal
arbiter of which rights are fundamental between and among the fifty
U.S. states and the federal government, and second by determining
which rights are guaranteed between and among nation states.253
Incorporation first allows for procedural diversity but provides the
greatest guidance to individual U.S. states regarding criminal
procedural rights guarantees; fewer are then provided in cases of
extradition and recognition of foreign criminal judgments.254 In
furtherance of such second category, American leadership in the
creation of multilateral institutions such as Interpol,255 the United
Nations Office on Drugs and Crime,256 the Egmont Group of Financial
Intelligence Units,257 and various parts of the Organization of
American States258 provide some grounding for multilateral criminal
law enforcement cooperation and standards, while extradition and

251. JOHN RAWLS, THE LAW OF PEOPLES 36–37 (1999). For “decent peoples,” Rawls
identifies a narrower core of human rights, such as the right to life, right to liberty,
right to property, and to formal equality. Id. at 59–65. Such distinctions are one of many
critiques that scholars have advanced against The Law of Peoples. See BROCK, supra note
245, at 28 (“Another common observation is that Rawls provides very little
argument . . . for why decent societies would endorse only the limited set of human
rights [whereas] liberal societies . . . would want to add more to the list of human
rights . . . .”). Rawls uses the case of fair trade to show that—in addition to principles
that define the basic equality of all peoples—parties will establish guidelines to set up
cooperative organizations and agree to standards of fairness of trade alongside
provisions for mutual assistance. Rawls, supra note 249, at 231.
252. BROCK, supra note 245, at 38 (“Quite apart from which [human rights] Rawls
actually means to endorse, there is the question of those he should endorse, if his
project is to be consistent.”).
253. Rawls, supra note 249, at 231 (arguing that peoples’ “concern for human
rights leads them to limit a state’s right of internal sovereignty”).
254. See supra Part I.A.
255. Todd Sandler, Daniel G. Arce & Walter Enders, An Evaluation of Interpol’s
Cooperative-Based Counterterrorism Linkages, 54 J.L. & ECON. 79, 80–82 (2011).
256. Eve de Coning & Gunnar Stolsvik, Combating Organised Crime at Sea: What
Role for the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime, 28 INT’L J. MARINE & COASTAL L.
189, 190 (2013).
257. Endre Nyitrai, Money Laundering and Organised Crime, 2015 J. E.-EUR. CRIM. L.
94, 95.
258. David P. Warner, Law Enforcement Cooperation in the Organization of
American States: A Focus on REMJA, 37 U. MIA. INTER-AM. L. REV. 387, 395–97 (2006).

298

MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW

[105:251

mutual legal assistance treaties ground bilateral law enforcement
cooperation.259
Even more to the point, Charles Beitz advances two potential
grounds for thinking about human rights—and thus, by definition,
certain criminal procedural rights—as a neutral, “nonparochial” basis
for criminal procedural line drawing.260 First, human rights could
meet a reasonableness—as opposed to complete agreement—
standard.261 This then provides a universal and legitimate basis from
which to criticize states and, thus, constrain them.262 Drawing on
Michael Walzer, Beitz notes that a comparison of moral codes across
societies may produce a set of universal standards—including human
rights and certain rules such as those prohibiting murder, deceit,
torture, and oppression—that constitute a “moral minimum.”263
Second, Beitz also offers the Rawlsian idea of “overlapping consensus”
of political moralities to accentuate rights acceptable by a reasonable
person consistently with acceptance of any of the main global
conceptions of political and economic justice.264 Broader than a
“common core” of human rights, it would instead reflect a broad
account of rights that each culture could reasonably accept as
consistent with its moral conventions.265 Without fully endorsing
either conception, Beitz notes that human rights signal the minimal
legitimacy of a society.266 In other words, while human rights may not
indicate that a nation is fully legitimate, such rights may meet the
threshold necessary for the nation to merit respect as a minimally
legitimate cooperating member of international society.267
Beitz’s framework helps theorize a field in which judges, law
enforcement, and diplomats are making criminal procedural decisions
in law enforcement cooperation. In this space, criminal procedural
259. Id.
260. Charles R. Beitz, Human Rights as a Common Concern, 95 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 269,
272 (2001).
261. Thom Brooks, Introduction to Part III to THE GLOBAL JUSTICE READER, supra note
240, at 117. See generally KATRINA FORRESTER, IN THE SHADOW OF JUSTICE: POSTWAR
LIBERALISM AND THE REMAKING OF POLITICAL PHILOSOPHY 140–71 (2019) (describing the
emergence of global justice theory in the 1970s and 1980s).
262. Brooks, supra note 261.
263. Beitz, supra note 260. R.J. Vincent has similarly pointed to a certain “lowest
common denominator . . . core of basic rights that is common to all cultures despite
their apparently divergent theories.” Id.
264. Id. at 273.
265. Id.
266. Id. at 274.
267. Id.
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rights are not rigid protections that simply do or do not exist.268
Instead, a broad standard of reasonableness governs cooperation, as
certain rights provide indicia of minimal legitimacy for purposes of
extradition, mutual legal assistance, and other forms of information
sharing.269 And furthermore, multilateral human rights treaties
provide a contractarian foundation for the legal duties that states owe
to their own and other nationals, in the form of criminal procedural
rights.270 This both explains and justifies U.S. law enforcement
cooperation with certain countries. Germany, South Korea, and
Argentina necessarily lack the exact same constellation of rights that
exist in the United States, but at the same time have some minimum
core of criminal procedural rights that resemble our own.271 From a
political theoretical perspective, their commitment to enumerated
human rights as holistic systems, while not identical, provide
reasonable protection along certain constitutional safeguards. This is
what Rawls identified as one of the essential criteria for liberal
peoples, namely, a reasonably just constitutional democratic
government that serves their fundamental interests.272 Such
governments are effectively under the political and electoral control
of their people, answering to and protecting fundamental interests
that are specified in constitutions and their interpretations.273 But in
doing so, they apply coercive law to certain individuals in an arranged,
interpreted manner that, ultimately, legitimizes the global set of legal

268. See Feldman, supra note 182, at 1062–63.
269. Protection of basic human rights—along with non-arbitrary judgments and
punishment for heinous crimes—may constitute three moral requirements for a legal
system to qualify as legitimate. See id. (citing KWAME ANTHONY APPIAH, THE ETHICS OF
IDENTITY 88–99 (2005)).
270. Id. at 1056 (“Association is made the condition of legal duty—it is just that the
association is extended globally, either through the original social contract or through
some secondary contract among peoples or states.”). While Feldman considers natural
law as a foundation for a cosmopolitan conception of law, natural law seems
unnecessary where human rights treaties provide a contractarian foundation for
certain criminal procedural rights.
271. ICCPR, supra note 96. See generally CAT, supra note 104.
272. Rawls, supra note 249, at 222 (“Liberal peoples have three basic features: a
reasonably just constitutional democratic government that serves their fundamental
interests; citizens united by what Mill called ‘common sympathies’; and finally, a moral
nature.”); see also Feldman, supra note 182, at 1062 (“[L]egal systems must embrace
certain universal commitments simply in virtue of being legitimate legal systems. To
be a legitimate legal system, on this view, requires satisfying some basic moral
requirements . . . . [This] justifies the very undertaking of doing law, of coercing and
demanding compliance.”).
273. Rawls, supra note 249, at 222.
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systems.274 And in doing so, governments must honor human rights as
a necessary—but not sufficient—condition to be considered among
free and democratic peoples.275
B. FROM THEORY TO PRACTICE: HOW TO EVALUATE FOREIGN CRIMINAL
JUSTICE SYSTEMS
Moving now from theory toward practice, what constitutes
reasonableness when evaluating a foreign country’s criminal justice
system? Evaluation of foreign criminal justice systems is a particular,
“longstanding problem” for U.S. judges.276 Judges from Holmes277 to
Posner278 have run the gamut in their comfort and willingness to
evaluate such foreign legal systems.279 The answer is to ground rights
274. Feldman, supra note 182, at 1066.
275. Additionally, this global justice framework does not merely inform criminal
procedure; real-world criminal procedural line drawing also informs global justice
theory by focusing on a legal methodology to assess what specific legal rights may
constitute a “core” from a Rawlsian law of peoples perspective.
276. Jia, supra note 22 (manuscript at 30–31) (“Can American judges accurately
apply continental law? How much weight should be accorded to statutes, judicial
decisions, or treatises? Are the two systems close enough as to preclude the need for
experts?”).
277. Diaz v. Gonzalez, 261 U.S. 102, 106 (1923) (“When we contemplate [a foreign
legal] system from the outside it seems like a wall of stone, every part even with all the
others, except so far as our own local education may lead us to see subordinations to
which we are accustomed. But to one brought up within it, varying emphasis, tacit
assumptions, unwritten practices, a thousand influences gained only from life, may
give to the different parts wholly new values that logic and grammar never could have
got from the books.”).
278. Bodum USA, Inc. v. La Cafetiere, Inc., 621 F.3d 624, 633 (7th Cir. 2010)
(Posner, J., concurring) (“[O]ur linguistic provincialism does not excuse intellectual
provincialism. It does not justify our judges in relying on paid witnesses to spoon feed
them foreign law that can be found well explained in English-language treatises and
articles.”).
279. Jia, supra note 22 (manuscript at 31–32) (situating Holmes and Posner on
opposite ends of a continuum of legal-cultural translation). To some degree, this
question is inherent—and, arguably, an inherent flaw—in any reasonableness
standard. To use a famous and familiar example, the Katz test—which asks whether an
individual’s subjective expectation of privacy is one that society recognizes as
reasonable for purposes of determining what constitutes a “search” under the Fourth
Amendment—is often criticized for placing such societal determinations in the hands
of the subjective assessments of judges. Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 361
(Harlan, J., concurring); see, e.g., Orin S. Kerr, Four Models of Fourth Amendment
Protection, 60 STAN. L. REV. 503, 504 (2007) (“[N]o one seems to know what makes an
expectation of privacy constitutionally ‘reasonable’”); Carpenter v. United States, 138
S. Ct. 2206, 2246 (2018) (Thomas, J., dissenting) (“The only thing the past three
decades have established about the Katz test is that society’s expectations of privacy
bear an uncanny resemblance to those expectations of privacy that this Court
considers reasonable.” (internal quotations omitted)). In the cross-border context,
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in a methodology that all three U.S. government branches should
apply.280
In this cross-border space, both international human rights law
and comparative legal method are applicable.281 First, international
human rights norms provide a global baseline of individual
protections, rooted in universality, human autonomy, and human
dignity.282 Furthermore, due to their force of law in virtually all
countries today, human rights laws protect U.S. and foreign nationals
at home but also when being prosecuted in foreign systems. And they
provide a mutually agreed upon criminal283 procedural foundation for
the interaction of two systems when they cooperate in cross-border
law enforcement. Indeed, human rights may be a ground for foreign
policymakers and judges may similarly default to their own expectation of what is
reasonable, which to some degree is rooted in their historically and culturally
contingent assessments as to what process is “good enough.” This may open them to
the charge that they find Western countries “good enough” and non-Western countries
lacking, a variation on the racial disparity questions that plague criminal justice
systems today. See Jia, supra note 22 (manuscript at 58–59) (describing how a judge
may use “a Western ear” to cause bias).
280. A broad reasonableness regime is also evident in the European Court of
Human Rights’ “margin of appreciation,” wherein compromises are made between the
goals of fundamental rights and the circumstances for limitations to these rights in
particular national jurisdictions. See Janneke Gerards, Margin of Appreciation and
Incrementalism in the Case Law of the European Court of Human Rights, 18 HUM. RTS. L.
REV. 495, 498 (2018). The Restatement (Third) of Foreign Relations Law also advanced
reasonableness as a limitation on the jurisdiction to prescribe, though this was
removed in the Fourth Restatement. Compare RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELS. L.
OF THE U.S. § 403(1) (AM. L. INST. 1987) (“Even when one of the bases for jurisdiction
under § 402 is present, a state may not exercise jurisdiction to prescribe law with
respect to a person or activity having connections with another state when the exercise
of such jurisdiction is unreasonable.”), with RESTATEMENT (FOURTH) OF FOREIGN RELS. L.
OF THE U.S. (AM. L. INST. 2018). See generally Steven Arrigg Koh, The Criminalization of
Foreign Policy (unpublished manuscript) (on file with author) (calling for a principled
engagement when engaging with foreign countries that have politicized their criminal
justice systems).
281. A cosmopolitan conception of legal duty may involve each system applying its
version of certain universal laws to everyone with whom it comes into contact. See
Feldman, supra note 182, at 1064. In so doing in the criminal space, each system must
apply its version of certain universal procedural protections as well. Id.
282. See Jack Donnelly, The Relative Universality of Human Rights, 29 HUM. RTS. Q.
281, 281, 297, 306 (2007). Other scholars have noted the usefulness of human rights
treaties as a procedural baseline in the extradition and constitutional
extraterritoriality contexts. See John T. Parry, International Extradition, the Rule of
Non-Inquiry, and the Problem of Sovereignty, 90 B.U. L. REV. 1973, 2007–14 (2010).
283. See Piet Hein Van Kempen, Introduction to CRIMINAL LAW AND HUMAN RIGHTS
xiii (P.H.P.H.M.C. van Kempen ed., 2014) (“Human rights have touched on almost every
aspect of criminal procedure law and practice, regardless of the specifics of any given
criminal justice system.”).
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cooperation, not just coercive intervention.284 Second, comparative
functionalism guides how foreign criminal justice systems’ procedural
protections may reasonably be interpreted on their own terms.285 This
gets to the nub of how, holistically, certain sets of rights and
procedures in a foreign criminal justice system constitute sufficient
criminal process, even though individual rights may not—indeed,
cannot—function in precisely the same way in any two systems. As
with any system—political, linguistic, or religious, for example—a
comparative approach reveals the historical and cultural contingency
of a system that justifies itself completely from an internal perspective
but takes on a new valence from an external perspective. In criminal
justice, for example, cultures of punishment vary: America’s culture of

284. Beitz, supra note 260, at 275–76.
285. See, e.g., Mark Tushnet, The Possibilities of Comparative Constitutional Law,
108 YALE L.J. 1225, 1238–69 (1999) (examining the role of functionalism in
comparative constitutional law). Of course, as an epistemological matter, one criminal
justice system cannot completely understand another from that foreign criminal
justice system’s “internal perspective,” given that legal rules and texts are themselves
deeply rooted within a distinct economic, political, moral, and cultural context. Nils
Jansen, Comparative Law and Comparative Knowledge, in THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF
COMPARATIVE LAW, supra note 28, at 306 (“For a long time, comparative lawyers have
regarded it as their methodological problem to be gaining knowledge of another
system and understand its way of reasoning: in applying concepts, rules or precedents,
and, more basically, in knowing the relevant sources of knowledge.”). Criminal justice
is “culture-bearing,” and as an artifact of culture brings with it the challenges of
translating one culture to another. Joshua Kleinfeld, Two Cultures of Punishment, 68
STAN. L. REV. 933, 940 (2016) (“[Criminal justice] is . . . the site at which cultures
negotiate certain kinds of issues connected to wrongdoing and community, social
order and violence, identity, the power of the state, and the terms of collective ethical
life.”). See generally MITCHEL DE S.-O.-L’E. LASSER, JUDICIAL DELIBERATIONS: A COMPARATIVE
ANALYSIS OF TRANSPARENCY AND LEGITIMACY (2009) (discussing the varied conceptions
of French, American, and European Union judicial decision-making and related
discursive practices within each system). And functionalism itself is both mainstream
and highly criticized as a comparative legal methodology. See Jansen, supra, at 308
(“[C]omparative lawyers have always analysed legal rules and systems in their
historical context, reconstructing the individual functions of rules from within the
individual legal system.”); Ralf Michaels, The Functional Method of Comparative Law,
in THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF COMPARATIVE LAW, supra note 28, at 340–43 (“The
functional method has become both the mantra and the bête noire of comparative
law.”). While a more rigorous defense of functionalism is beyond the scope of this
Article, suffice it to say that functionalism advantageously avoids essentializing any
particular legal element in a given legal system, instead focusing on its connection with
another variable element and, more generally, describing groups of legal elements
without the specificity that comes with traditional, abstracted legal classification. Id. at
355–56.
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punishment likely views offender criminality as immutable and
devaluing, while European culture does not.286
This Part addresses this question by providing a tripartite
framework for evaluating foreign sovereigns. It then prescribes
process roles for each of the three branches of government in
furtherance of such framework.
1. A Tripartite Framework: Constitutional, Human Rights, and
Comparative
Let us now operationalize the tripartite framework. Judges and
policymakers should draw on three sources when articulating core
criminal procedure. First, judges and policymakers should use U.S.
constitutional procedure rights as their baseline. This can include
both resemblance to enumerated rights in the U.S. Constitution and
lessons from the incorporation of procedural guarantees. For
example, as noted above, the Fourteenth Amendment due process
clause does not incorporate the Fifth Amendment right to indictment
by grand jury, suggesting that it is not as fundamental to AngloAmerican jurisprudence as, say, the right to a speedy and public
trial.287 This provides a clear basis upon which to reject any defendant
challenge that a foreign process violates this right because it lacks
indictment by grand jury.
Second, the branches should consider international human rights
standards. As noted in Part I above, the history of negotiation and
ratification of international human rights instruments demonstrates
the U.S. government’s willingness to affirm certain rights as core. And
such instruments affirm the duties owed to the United States and
286. Kleinfeld, supra note 285, at 941; see also James Q. Whitman, Presumption of
Innocence or Presumption of Mercy?: Weighing Two Western Modes of Justice, 94 TEX. L.
REV. 933, 934 (2016) (noting that continental European courts place less emphasis on
the presumption of innocence than the United States does, opting instead for
protections for the guilty and thus inflicting less excessive punishment). The doctrine
evinces this awareness at the limits of constitutional applicability. For example,
Boumediene noted that “questions of extraterritoriality turn on objective factors and
practical concerns, not formalism.” Boumediene v. Bush, 553 U.S. 723, 764 (2008) (“A
constricted reading of Eisentrager overlooks what we see as a common thread uniting
the Insular Cases, Eisentrager, and Reid: the idea that questions of extraterritoriality
turn on objective factors and practical concerns, not formalism.”). And it provides
some guidance that “cultural inappropriateness”—for example, the Insular Cases
reticence to impose common law procedures on a population accustomed to the civil
law—is one of the factors the Boumediene court identified when courts may identify
enforcement of a right as “impracticable and anomalous.” Boumediene v. Bush, 553
U.S. 723, 770 (2008); see Neuman, supra note 127, at 269.
287. See supra Part I.A.1.
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other nationals in cross-border criminal cases. For example, the right
to the trial by jury is conspicuously absent, whereas the right against
retroactivity is integral to all.288 In so doing, they may also consult the
general comments and reports of the human rights treaty bodies that
monitor the implementation of human rights treaties.289
Third and finally, the relevant legal actors may use functionalism
to ask how certain rights have been or will be upheld in a foreign
criminal justice system. This functionalism analysis materially differs
from the incorporation context, which asks more narrowly whether
the provision was fundamental to Anglo-American jurisprudence.290
Instead, the query is whether such rights may be reasonably
interpreted as upheld based on that legal system’s own terms. So, for
example, the role of the civil law investigating judge is foreign to
common law judges and policymakers, in particular the idea that a
judge can build a record that is automatically admitted into evidence
before criminal proceedings begin. But from a functionalist
perspective this judicial role makes sense, given civil law judges act
within a broader system lacking a jury; in such systems, judges are
making factual and legal determinations as neutral adjudicators
determining guilt or innocence. Indeed, a functionalist perspective
focuses “not on rules alone but on their effects, not on doctrinal
structures . . . alone but on the consequences they bring about.”291
288. UDHR, supra note 83, art. 11(2) (“No one shall be held guilty of any penal
offence on account of any act or omission which did not constitute a penal offence,
under national or international law, at the time when it was committed.”); ICCPR supra
note 96, art. 15.1 (“No one shall be held guilty of any criminal offence on account of any
act or omission which did not constitute a criminal offence, under national or
international law, at the time when it was committed.”); U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9 (“No . . .
ex post facto Law shall be passed.”); U.S. CONST. art. I, § 10 (“No State shall . . . pass
any . . . ex post facto Law.”).
289. See, e.g., Hum. Rts. Comm., supra note 96, ¶ 5 (“While reservations to
particular clauses of article 14 may be acceptable, a general reservation to the right to
a fair trial would be incompatible with the object and purpose of the Covenant.”).
290. Timbs v. Indiana, 139 S. Ct. 682, 689–90 (2019) (incorporating the Excessive
Fines Clause and noting that “protection against excessive fines has been a constant
shield throughout Anglo-American history”).
291. Michaels, supra note 285, at 47–48 (“Institutions, both legal and non-legal,
even doctrinally different ones, are deemed comparable if they are functionally
equivalent, i[.]e[.], if they fulfill similar functions in different legal systems.”). For
example, Akhil Amar has argued that the Sixth Amendment right to trial by jury is a
required component of a tribunal’s structure not just an accused’s individual right to
be waived at her discretion. Akhil Reed Amar, The Bill of Rights as a Constitution, 100
YALE L.J. 1131, 1196 (1991). As Raustiala has noted, the latter interpretation would
provide greater restraint on the government—just as the U.S. Senate in Mexico could
not bypass bicameralism, a U.S. tribunal located elsewhere may not bypass a jury in
convicting a person of a criminal offense. See RAUSTIALA, supra note 19, at 67.
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Applying this tripartite framework to the right to trial by jury is
instructive. First, the right to trial by jury is codified in both Article III
and the Sixth Amendment of the U.S. Constitution and has been
incorporated through the Fourteenth Amendment Due Process Clause
to apply to the states.292 Owing to this, as Justice Scalia once
memorably noted, courts engaging with this guarantee are “operating
upon the spinal column of American democracy.”293 But this right is
lacking in any international human rights treaty—most saliently the
ICCPR—given it is a creature of common law and conspicuously
absent from most civil law jurisdictions.294 And second, deploying a
functionalist view, the absence of a jury trial right in foreign
jurisdictions is not problematic from a holistic comparative
perspective, given that in civil law countries judges are making factual
and legal determinations as neutral adjudicators. As such, courts may
deny defendants’ challenges to admission of evidence, upward
departure of sentences, or extradition if such challenges are grounded
in the argument that civil law countries lack a jury trial right. This
affirms the rhetorical flourish of the U.S. District Court for the Eastern
District of Pennsylvania, which as described in the Introduction, held
that it would be “cultural imperialism” to insist on a Sixth Amendment
right to trial by jury abroad.295
By contrast, the tripartite framework affirms the right to counsel
as part of the inner core of criminal procedure. First, like the right to
trial by jury, the right to counsel is codified in the Sixth Amendment
and applies to the U.S. states through incorporation.296 But it is also
codified in the ICCPR, wherein Article 14(3)(b) affirms defendants’
right “[t]o have adequate time and facilities for the preparation of his
defence and to communicate with counsel of his own choosing.”297
And finally, a functionalist comparative analysis affirms that virtually

292. U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2; id. amends. VI, XIV.
293. Neder v. United States, 527 U.S. 1, 30 (1999) (Scalia, J., concurring) (“When
this Court deals with the content of this guarantee—the only one to appear in both the
body of the Constitution and the Bill of Rights—it is operating upon the spinal column
of American democracy.”).
294. See generally Hans, supra note 165 (surveying and comparing lay
participation systems worldwide).
295. Cf. United States v. Moskovits, 784 F. Supp. 193, 196 (E.D. Pa. 1992) (“It would,
however, be a form of cultural imperialism for the United States to insist that it would
not countenance, for U.S. purposes, recognition of a foreign criminal judgment which
came from a legal culture which did not employ the jury . . . .”).
296. Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963) (incorporating the Sixth
Amendment right to counsel).
297. ICCPR, supra note 96.
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all states guarantee a right to counsel.298 Indeed, while counsel in a
civil law system relies less on adversarial functions such as crossexamining witnesses, it plays a largely analogous function vis-à-vis the
state and the judiciary in civil law systems.299 But in the case of
Rwandan gacaca courts, which included a community-based
conception of justice but lacked a functional equivalent of a right to
counsel,300 U.S. courts should not rely on such proceedings for
purposes of upward departure. The U.S. District Court for the
Northern District of Iowa was thus wrong in its use of Rwandan
gacaca in absentia convictions in its upward departure at sentencing
in Ngombwa.301
2. Separation of Powers
Let us now consider how the three branches of government may
apply this tripartite framework to better articulate core criminal
procedure.
The tripartite framework prescription must balance the inherent
tension when foreign affairs and criminal justice mix: the executive
branch has comparative foreign affairs expertise, while the legislature
has an affirmative mandate to articulate criminal law and procedure.
In traditional criminal cases, all three government branches play
familiar roles. Congress passes criminal laws, the executive branch
enforces them, and the judiciary adjudicates questions arising from
them. But contemporary cross-border law enforcement cooperation
complicates this picture, particularly because courts are less
equipped—though arguably not ill-equipped—to evaluate foreign
jurisdictions’ criminal justice systems. In other words, criminal
procedural line drawing is both outside of core judicial competence—
because courts are not foreign affairs authorities302—and within it—
298. Laura K. Abel & Lora J. Livingston, The Existing Civil Right to Counsel
Infrastructure, JUDGES J., Fall 2008, at 24, 24 (2008).
299. See VIVIENNE O’CONNOR, PRACTITIONER’S GUIDE: COMMON LAW AND CIVIL LAW
TRADITIONS 20–21 (2012), https://www.fjc.gov/sites/default/files/2015/Common%
20and%20Civil%20Law%20Traditions.pdf [https://perma.cc/NQC2-XPYF]
(surveying the role of defense counsel in civil law countries).
300. See United States v. Ngombwa, No. 14-CR-123-LRR, 2017 WL 508208, at *4
(N.D. Iowa Feb. 7, 2017) (explaining how Rwandan communities were tasked with
prosecuting genocide perpetrators).
301. United States v. Ngombwa, 893 F.3d 546, 556 (8th Cir. 2018); see also
Ngombwa, 2017 WL 508208, at *19 n. 8.
302. Compare U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8 (giving congress the power to declare war and
collect imposts (among other things)), and id. art. II, § 2 (empowering the President to
make treaties and appoint ambassadors), with id. art. III, § 2 (giving the judiciary the
power to hear cases involving foreign actors, but not actively make policy).
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because they regularly adjudicate defendant rights.303 The political
branches, then, are left with unusually wide discretion to enact new
laws, ratify treaties, and enforce domestic and foreign criminal laws
within this framework. A prescriptive account may thus resolve many
of the doctrinal tensions and ambiguities above by drawing on the
executive’s foreign affairs expertise, followed by Congress and the
judiciary exercising their more traditional functions as criminal
justice system actors.
Broadly speaking, a prescriptive institutional account must
uphold two broad principles. First, returning to the descriptive
taxonomy in Part I, criminal procedural evaluation in this space
should shift toward the core criminal procedure approach—which
includes a deliberate, ex ante, core criminal procedure to which other
sovereigns must adhere—from the outlier approach—a more ad hoc,
retrospective, generalized assessment of foreign criminal justice
systems.304 More explicit guidance in this space allows for a better
evaluation of foreign criminal justice systems and a more established
framework for resolving the numerous criminal procedural questions
that arise in cross-border spaces.305 And second, all three branches
should have the opportunity to engage more explicitly in an
assessment of the tripartite framework described above—rooted in
constitutional, international human rights, and comparative law.306
Starting with Congress, it should continue to codify its guidance
regarding cross-border criminal procedural rights, as it has recently
done with the CLOUD Act. After all, the written statute requirement in
criminal law dictates that legislatures codify both substantive offenses
and procedure, given the liberty interests at stake in criminal
justice.307 Why is it, for example, that Congress currently insists upon
certain rights protections regarding transfer of electronic data abroad

303. Scholars addressing the rule of non-inquiry have addressed this institutional
design question to some degree. John Parry, for example, has called for a more engaged
judicial role in the extradition process and, thus, a more limited version of the rule of
non-inquiry. See John T. Parry, International Extradition, the Rule of Non-Inquiry, and
the Problem of Sovereignty, 90 B.U. L. REV. 1973, 2003 (2010) (“I do not want to
overstate the current willingness of courts to relax their deference to foreign affairs
concerns . . . . Similarly, I do not mean to deny the importance of foreign affairs
concerns.”).
304. Supra Part I.A.
305. Supra Part I.A.
306. Supra Part I.A.
307. See The Nature, Purpose, and Function of Criminal Law, in CONTEMPORARY
CRIMINAL LAW 1, 5 (2019).
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for purposes of prosecuting foreign nationals308 but does not do so in
the context of extradition, wherein a U.S. citizen may be physically
transferred abroad to be prosecuted there? More explicit guidance
provides notice to defendants, both American and non-American,
regarding the procedural rights at stake in cross-border prosecutions.
For its part, the executive branch likely already engages in some
form of this tripartite inquiry when deciding, for example, whether to
conclude a bilateral law enforcement treaty with another
sovereign.309 As noted at the outset, core criminal procedure is an
explanatory account, grounded in what is likely State Department
attorney practice. It is not a coincidence, for example, that the United
States has a more robust law enforcement relationship with the
United Kingdom than it does with China or Rwanda, owing to the rule
of law in such countries.310 The State Department, in conjunction with
DOJ, has the foreign affairs expertise and negotiation capability to
conclude law enforcement treaties with foreign countries. But the
State Department should also make such findings more explicit,
particularly in the transmittal of such information to Congress for
advice and consent prior to ratification. As of now, such findings are
largely non-existent.311 In virtually all cases, this ensures that the
executive branch’s evaluation of foreign process—rooted in its foreign
affairs expertise—will inform Congress’s evaluation of the relevant
treaty or law.

308. 18 U.S.C. § 2523(b)(1)(B)(iii). The Act also specifies certain requirements for
the agreements themselves, such as a prohibition on targeting U.S. persons. See 18
U.S.C. § 2523(b)(4). As noted above, the CLOUD Act specifies fair trial rights; freedom
of expression, association, and peaceful assembly; prohibitions on arbitrary arrest and
detention; and prohibitions against torture and cruel, inhuman, or degrading
treatment or punishment.
309. See generally U.S. DEP’T OF STATE, SUPPLEMENTARY HANDBOOK ON THE C-175
PROCESS: ROUTINE SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY AGREEMENTS (2009) (providing an overview
of treaty negotiation and ratification, which includes inter-agency consultation and
review).
310. By “rule of law” I mean, broadly, “a requirement that people in positions of
authority should exercise their power within a constraining framework of public
norms, rather than on the basis of their own preferences, their own ideology, or their
own individual sense of right and wrong.” Jeremy Waldron, The Concept and the Rule
of Law, 43 GA. L. REV. 1, 6 (2008) (citing RONALD A. CASS, THE RULE OF LAW IN AMERICA 17
(2001)). Rule of law thus emphasizes legal certainty, predictability, settlement, the
determinacy of certain societal norms, and the state’s reliable administration of such
norms. Id.
311. See, e.g., Extradition Treaty Between the Government of the United States of
America and the Government of the Republic of Kosovo, U.S.-Kos., Mar. 29, 2016,
T.I.A.S. 19-613.
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Turning to the judiciary, such explicit findings will inform courts’
decisions as to whether a foreign criminal justice system satisfies core
criminal procedure. Currently, DOJ rarely makes representations on
the merits about foreign procedure at extradition hearings, instead
insisting simply that courts abide by the rule of non-inquiry.312 When
the executive branch enters into an extradition treaty, “that branch is
presumed to have studied the other country’s criminal justice system
and determined that [extradition of individuals to that country] is
sufficiently fair.”313 As such, the executive has no occasion to argue
about foreign criminal procedure in an extradition proceeding. Thus,
courts are right to generally uphold the rule of non-inquiry, given that
it reflects the considered position of the executive branch in
evaluating, among other things, process in a foreign country. But
often, courts are relying on ad hoc determinations about foreign
criminal process.314 More explicit executive branch findings regarding
foreign process mitigates the problem of the parochial district court
judge making such determinations beyond his or her core judicial
competence.315 Additionally, courts may use the tripartite framework
described above—domestic constitutional guarantees, international
312. See, e.g., Memorandum of Law in Support of Extradition at 9, In re Extradition
of Howard, 2017 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 104582 (D. Nev. 2017) (No. 2:15-MJ-00627-NJK) (“It
is the role of the Secretary of State, not judicial officers, to determine whether
extradition should be denied on humanitarian grounds or on account of the treatment
the fugitive will likely receive on return to the requesting country.”); Brief for United
States at 17, Hilton v. Kerry, 754 F.3d 79 (2014) (No. 13-2444) (“Here, [Appellant’s]
claims—which go to the procedures or treatment that he will receive if extradited to
the United Kingdom and the fairness of the Scottish system of criminal procedure—
are precisely the type of claims barred by the rule of non-inquiry.”); see also Ahmad v.
Wigen, 910 F.2d 1063, 1067 (2d Cir. 1990) (criticizing the district court’s
consideration of the “fairness” of requesting country’s criminal procedures).
313. Rachel A. Van Cleave, The Role of United States Federal Courts in Extradition
Matters: The Rule of Non-Inquiry, Preventive Detention and Comparative Legal Analysis,
13 TEMP. INT’L & COMPAR. L.J. 27, 40 (1999).
314. See supra notes 194–98.
315. For a country with which law enforcement cooperation is minimal, the
executive branch may lack public representations regarding the state of the country’s
criminal justice system. For example, as noted above, the United States does not have
an extradition treaty relationship with Rwanda. See 18 U.S.C. § 3181. Thus, even if
explicit findings at time of treaty ratification were routine State Department practice,
there would likely be less regarding Rwandan gacaca courts having sufficient process
for purposes of upward departure. The State Department does, however, issue annual
Country Reports on Human Rights Practices, pursuant to the Foreign Assistance Act of
1961 and the Trade Act of 1974. 2018 Country Reports on Human Rights Practices, U.S.
DEP’T STATE (2018), https://www.state.gov/reports/2018-country-reports-on
-human-rights-practices [https://perma.cc/HB5P-F7W7]. Such reports could
constitute a basis for judicial evaluation of foreign countries’ criminal process.
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human rights standards, and functionalist comparative evaluations—
in order to ensure that core criminal procedure’s fundamental rights
are being upheld.316
III. ENGAGEMENT WITH INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL
INSTITUTIONS
Core criminal procedure has implications beyond individual U.S
criminal cases; it has the potential to recast national engagement with
international courts and investigative mechanisms. This international
application may at first appear distinct from the domestic and
transnational contexts described above. And yet the ultimate
concern—how the United States conceives of criminal procedure
rights when engaging with other jurisdictions—is the same. As such,
this Part completes the discussion of core criminal procedure by
considering its function in the third of three tiers in which criminal
justice is articulated today: international criminal courts and
investigative mechanisms.
A. THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT
Core criminal procedure informs debate about U.S. engagement
with international criminal courts. As is well known, the United
States—and the international community as a whole—has created

316. While it is beyond the scope of this Article, in the long term courts could also
“constitutionalize” this space—or, arguably, do so once again. As noted above, the
Supreme Court has oscillated in its approach to when the U.S. Constitution—and,
specifically, its Bill of Rights guarantees—applies, where, and to whom. See discussion
supra Part I.A.1. The Court could return to its jurisprudence before Verdugo-Urquidez
in 1990, applying a more robust conception of rights both extraterritorially and to U.S.
and other citizens abroad. In other words, if many of these questions lie just outside of
the edge of constitutional applicability, the Court could expand constitutional
application to regulate this space. This would not be unprecedented: the United States
holds within it other domestic sovereigns, and the Supreme Court has, at times, “closed
the gap” to ensure that individual states may not circumvent federal protections. See,
e.g., Elkins v. United States, 364 U.S. 206 (1960). The clearest example of this is the
mechanism of incorporation, which closes cross-sovereign law enforcement loopholes.
Take, for example, the previously problematic “silver platter doctrine”: prior to 1960,
evidence illegally obtained by state law enforcement authorities could nonetheless be
introduced at trial in federal court, as long as federal officials played no role in
gathering it. Id. at 208. In Elkins v. United States, the Supreme Court closed this gap,
holding that such a doctrine engendered too many “practical difficulties” to continue
to be upheld “in an era of expanding federal criminal jurisdiction . . . .” Id. at 211. Crossborder law enforcement represents yet another front in which the role of other
sovereigns may factor into criminal cases outside of orthodox criminal process.
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international and hybrid tribunals to prosecute atrocity crimes.317 U.S.
leadership has included creation of the post-World War II
International Military Tribunals in Nuremberg, as well as the U.N.
International Criminal Tribunals for the former Yugoslavia and for
Rwanda.318 More recently, however, the United States has entered a
period of oscillating hostility and engagement towards the
International Criminal Court (ICC) and has signed but not ratified the
Rome Statute of the ICC.319 For example, when serving as Trump
Administration National Security Adviser, John Bolton openly
declared that the United States “will let the ICC die on its own” given
that “the ICC is already dead to us.”320
How does core criminal procedure influence our conception of
this international system? It undermines a key argument against
Rome Statute ratification, namely, that it would deny U.S. nationals the
process that U.S. criminal justice customarily affords them.321 A classic
critique of the ICC is that it lacks the proper U.S. criminal procedural
safeguards. As grounding for their criticism, scholars have used as a
baseline both the Bill of Rights and more granular criminal procedure,
such as the ability to object to the introduction of hearsay as evidence
at criminal trials.322 Most often invoked is that the ICC lacks a jury trial,
as guaranteed by Article III and the Sixth Amendment of the U.S.
Constitution.323
317. See generally Harold Hongju Koh, International Criminal Justice 5.0, 38 YALE
INT’L L. 525 (2013) (reviewing the history of U.S. leadership and engagement with
international criminal tribunals, including that of the Obama administration with the
ICC and ICC assembly of State Parties).
318. Id. at 525–30.
319. Id. at 533.
320. John Bolton, Nat’l Sec. Advisor, Address at the Federalist Society (Sept. 10,
2018), https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2018/09/full-text-john-bolton-speech
-federalist-society-180910172828633.html [https://perma.cc/H4Y5-G93L].
321. Id. (“The framers of our constitution considered such a melding of powers
unacceptable for our own government, and we should certainly not accept it in the ICC.
Other governments may choose systems which reject the separation of powers, but not
the United States.”).
322. See, e.g., Lee A. Casey, The Case Against the International Criminal Court, 25
FORDHAM INT’L L.J. 840, 861–64 (2002) (“[N]either international criminal courts in
general, nor the ICC in particular, provide protections to the accused equivalent to
those guaranteed by the Bill of Rights.”); Andrew J. Walker, When a Good Idea Is Poorly
Implemented: How the International Criminal Court Fails to Be Insulated from
International Politics and to Protect Basic Due Process Guarantees, 106 W. VA. L. REV.
245, 278–79 (2004) (holding that the ICC is silent on, inter alia, the right to privacy,
the introduction of hearsay, and the definition of effective counsel).
323. See Casey, supra note 322, at 861 (“First, and foremost, the Rome Statute
makes no provision for trial by jury.”); JOHAN D. VAN DER VYVER, IMPLEMENTATION OF
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Core criminal procedure undermines this claim. As the above
discussion makes clear, the U.S. legal system long ago abandoned a
strict demand for criminal procedural sameness when it—in contrast
to certain civil law jurisdictions, such as Brazil324—made the
determination that it would extradite its own nationals for
prosecution in other countries.325 And the U.S. government has since
demonstrated across various doctrinal areas that it is relatively
comfortable with deferring to foreign criminal process so long as it
does not violate certain criminal procedural norms.326 As already
discussed above, the right to trial by jury is not and likely should not
be affirmed as necessary at all times in the cross-border context,
particularly given that international tribunals operate with judges as
fact finders in a manner derived from civil law systems.327 And
notwithstanding this particular right, the ICC meets all other
constitutional thresholds.328 Even a cursory glance at the ICC’s Rules
of Procedure and Evidence demonstrates a pre-trial, trial, and
INTERNATIONAL LAW IN THE UNITED STATES 181 (2010) (“The argument that seems to
surface most frequently questions the constitutional tenability of a treaty that would
expose nationals of the United States to criminal prosecution without the benefit of a
jury trial as guaranteed by the Sixth Amendment . . . .” (citing JACKSON NYAMUYA
MAOGOTO, STATE SOVEREIGNTY AND INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL LAW: VERSAILLES TO ROME
275–76 (2003))); Ilia B. Levitine, Constitutional Aspects of an International Criminal
Court, 92 N.Y. INT’L L. REV. 27, 37–38; Cara Levy Rodriques, Slaying the Monster: Why
the United States Should Not Support the Rome Treaty, 14 AM. U. INT’L L. REV. 805, 814–
15 (1999); Robinson O. Everett, American Servicemembers and the ICC, in THE UNITED
STATES AND THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT 137 (Sarah B. Sewall & Carl Kaysen eds.,
2000); Casey, supra note 322, at 842, 853, 861–63, 867–68.
324. CONSTITUIÇÃO FEDERAL [C.F.] [CONSTITUTION] art. LI (Braz.) (“[N]o Brazilian
shall be extradited, except for a naturalized Brazilian for a common crime committed
prior to naturalization, or proven involvement in unlawful traffic in narcotics and
similar drugs, as provided by law.”).
325. See supra Part I.B.3.
326. See supra Parts I, II.
327. See supra notes 258–66 and accompanying text.
328. Scheffer & Cox, supra note 26, at 1047–48, 1048 n.353 (“[A]n examination of
the due process rights demonstrates that with the exception of the right to trial by jury
. . . the ICC would provide a U.S. defendant with essentially the same due process rights
as enjoyed in U.S. courts.” (citing Ruth Wedgwood, The Constitution and the ICC, in THE
UNITED STATES AND THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT 119, 119–23 (Sarah B. Sewall &
Carl Kaysen eds., 2000))) (“[T]he ICC is carefully structured with procedural
protections that closely follow the guarantees and safeguards of the American Bill of
Rights and other liberal constitutional systems.”); Patricia M. Wald, International
Criminal Courts—A Stormy Adolescence, 46 VA. J. INT’L L. 319, 345 (2006) (“Opposition
is sometimes voiced . . . that the procedures of the ICC do not provide the fundamental
due process guarantees that our country holds indispensable . . . [y]et all of the
international tribunals so far, and certainly the ICC, have adopted the main principles
of the ICCPR, to which the United States is a signatory.”).

2020]

CORE CRIMINAL PROCEDURE

313

appellate procedural system that safeguards the Rome Statute’s
Article 55 rights of persons during an investigation—which includes
protections against self-incrimination and torture and the right to
counsel—as well as the Article 67 rights of the accused—including the
right to a public hearing, to be tried without undue delay, and to the
examination of witnesses.329
In the past, both scholars and State Department officials have
emphasized the ICC’s procedural acceptability.330 Louis Henkin,
writing before the advent of the ICC, emphasized this point in
comparison to extradition; from a contemporary perspective—which
includes the codification of ICC process and an expansive cross-border
system of criminal procedural flexibility—this only rings more true.331
More recently, David Scheffer and Ashley Cox have already gone rightby-right through the Rome Statute, showing how—broadly
speaking—the ICC upholds all fundamental rights in this space.332
Notably, they advise that “one can quibble about lack of precise parity”
with certain U.S. constitutional rights, but notes that the Rome Statute
system “do[es] not give rise to any serious doubt” about fundamental
protections.333 In this regard, they are correct.
This is not to say that the ICC’s procedural system is ideal, or
lacking need for reform. Scholars and practitioners alike have
criticized the ICC’s “hybrid” system of justice on its own merits,334 not
to mention the length of its trials and the disproportionate impact of
selective prosecutions on certain regions.335 Such critiques are
329. Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, 2187 U.N.T.S. 90 (entered
into force July 1, 2002) [hereinafter Rome Statute].
330. Scheffer & Cox, supra note 26, at 1047–49.
331. See LOUIS HENKIN, FOREIGN AFFAIRS AND THE UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION 270
(1996) (noting that ICC procedure is not more troubling than that arising in interstate
extradition); accord Scheffer & Cox, supra note 26, at 1033–34, 1034 n.268 (noting that
the U.S. Constitution does not require jury trials abroad, as evidenced by extradition
practice).
332. Scheffer & Cox, supra note 26, at 1050–59.
333. Id. at 1049–56 (reviewing ICC guarantees such as the right to remain silent,
prohibition against ex post facto crimes, and presence at trial). The Rome Statute even
prohibits trials in absentia, matching U.S. practice in the extradition context. Id. at 1054
(citing Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, supra note 329, art. 63 (“The
accused shall be present during the trial.”)).
334. Casey, supra note 322, at 842–43 (“Even the most closely related of the
world’s legal systems, the Common Law and the Civil Law, begin from fundamentally
different assumptions about the role of a criminal trial in the pursuit of justice.”).
335. Iain Macleod & Shehzad Charania, Three Challenges for the International
Criminal Court, OUPBLOG (Nov. 16, 2015), https://blog.oup.com/2015/11/three
-challenges-international-criminal-court [https://perma.cc/K462-MFCW]; cf. Tessa
Alleblas, Eamon Aloyo, Geoff Dancy & Yvonne Dutton, Is the International Criminal
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related—but distinct from—the question here, which is whether the
ICC passes a minimum threshold of procedural permissibility, judged
by the constitutional standards of the United States and the practice
of cross-border law enforcement cooperation.
B. INVESTIGATIVE MECHANISMS
Finally, core criminal procedure advances understanding of U.S.
engagement with new investigative, independent mechanisms
relevant to the development of international criminal law. One such
innovation is the development of international mechanisms that
collect evidence for the duration of armed conflict in afflicted states.336
The underlying idea behind such mechanisms is for state and
international actors to ultimately promote accountability for such
crimes through a variety of accountability mechanisms, including
international tribunals and domestic prosecutions.337
Two prominent mechanisms relate to Syria and Myanmar.338 The
former, established in December 2016 pursuant to U.N. General
Assembly Resolution 71/248, is formally called the International,
Impartial and Independent Mechanism to Assist in the Investigation
and Prosecution of Persons Responsible for the Most Serious Crimes
Under International Law Committed in the Syrian Arab Republic Since
March 2011 (IIIM).339 Its formal mandate is to collect evidence of
Court Biased Against Africans? Kenyan Victims Don’t Think So, WASH. POST (Mar. 6, 2017,
5:00 AM), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/monkey-cage/wp/2017/03/06/
is-the-international-criminal-court-biased-against-africans-kenyan-victims-don’t
-think-so [https://perma.cc/S6YC-7Y4Q] (discussing that Kenya’s government has
consistently argued that the ICC is biased toward Africans).
336. See Lara Talsma, UN Human Rights Fact-Finding: Protecting a Protection
Mechanism, 20 ILSA Q. 29 (2012) (“After sporadic use of [human rights fact-finding]
mechanism[s] in the 1960s and 1970s through ad hoc missions, a system of both
permanent and ad hoc fact-finding missions was developed since the 1980s and is now
well established within the UN framework.”).
337. See id. at 33 (“[O]ne of the main purposes of fact-finding missions is to hold
perpetrators accountable.”).
338. See Isabella Regan, Justice in an Ever-Evolving (Digital) World—A Reflection on
the Annual International Bar Association’s War Crimes Conference, 11 AMSTERDAM L.F.
50, 61–63 (2019). The United Nations Investigative Team to Promote Accountability
for Crimes Committed by Da’esh/ISIL (UNITAD), established in 2017, represents a
variation of such mechanisms. The difference between this mechanism and IIIM, the
UN mechanism for Syria, is that the former’s mandate is much narrower, focusing on
one group alone, known as Daesh. Its main tasks are “collecting, preserving and storing
evidence” of Daesh’s war crimes, as well as coordinating collection efforts with local
actors within Iraq and Syria. Id. at 62.
339. Mandate, INT’L, IMPARTIAL & INDEP. MECHANISM, https://iiim.un.org/mandate
[https://perma.cc/9BYZ-9PKJ].
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human rights violations committed in Syria for the purpose of
presenting such evidence in future national or international criminal
proceedings.340 Thus far, it has collected over a million records and
received requests from judicial authorities in at least five countries for
cooperation in Syria-related cases.341 The Human Rights Council
established the latter, called the Independent Investigative
Mechanism for Myanmar (IIMM), in September 2018 through
resolution 39/2.342 Similarly, its mandate is to assemble evidence of
international crimes and violations of international law committed in
Myanmar for use in future prosecutions.343 Thus far, it conducted its
first mission to Bangladesh in November 2019, explaining its mandate
and leading discussions with representatives of the community and
other civil leaders.344
The link to core criminal procedure is likely, at this point, obvious
to the reader. These United Nations mechanisms are collecting
information to be used in criminal prosecutions; if such information is
later introduced as evidence in U.S. criminal prosecutions for
individuals in the United States who were alleged to have perpetrated
crimes in these relevant countries, and the United States has
jurisdiction over such crimes, the focus will likely turn to the U.N.
methods of collection and whether such methods violate domestic
norms for criminal procedure rights. Although some NGOs such as
Global Rights Compliance have attempted to codify a range of
minimum standards for the investigation of international crimes,345
no standard procedure governs how fact-finding should be conducted
by such international investigatory mechanisms.346 Thus, every
340. Id.
341. Stephanie Nebehay, U.N. Investigators Hot on Trail of Syrian War Criminals,
REUTERS (Mar. 8, 2019, 6:16 AM), https://www.reuters.com/article/us-mideast-crisis
-syria-warcrimes/un-investigators-hot-on-trail-of-syrian-war-criminals-idUSKCN
1QP1AF.
342. Independent Investigative Mechanism for Myanmar, U.N. HUM. RTS. COUNCIL,
https://ohchr.org/EN/HRBodies/HRC/IIMM/Pages/Index.aspx [https://perma.cc/
L2UM-CDGB].
343. Id.
344. Myanmar Mechanism Conducts First Official Mission to Bangladesh, U.N. HUM.
RTS. COUNCIL (Nov. 18, 2019), https://www.ohchr.org/EN/HRBodies/HRC/Pages/
NewsDetail.aspx?NewsID=25310 [https://perma.cc/3FPE-SMKW].
345. See Basic Investigative Standards for International Crimes Investigations, GLOB.
RTS.
COMPLIANCE,
https://www.globalrightscompliance.com/en/projects/basic
-investigative-standards-for-international-crimes-investigations [https://perma.cc/
9798-GQNZ]. Many of Global Rights Compliance’s standards are modeled on those
utilized by the International Criminal Court. Id.
346. Talsma, supra note 336, at 32.
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mandate-holder needs to decide such standards for itself. In the case
of the IIIM, it has yet to clarify any procedural guidelines relating to
the mechanism’s evidence-gathering and review functions.347
Similarly, with respect to the IIMM, its precise procedures and
methods of work remain unspecified, although it has articulated that
such procedures and methods, once developed, would be designed to
ensure [the evidence’s] “integrity and preservation” and protect the
“security and privacy of witnesses.”348 Given this opacity, whether and
how such information is introduced into evidence in U.S. prosecutions
remains an open question. Very likely, defendants will assert that
introduction of such information would shock the conscience, or
offend some other set of rights. Future research will illuminate this
intriguing procedural question, at the intersection of U.S. criminal
prosecutions and emerging international criminal legal institutions.
But a core criminal procedure approach, rooted in the tripartite
methodology described above, will provide the most effective means
of safeguarding criminal defendant rights in this emerging
transnational criminal space.
CONCLUSION
“To what criminal procedural standard do we hold another
sovereign?”
This question has sounded throughout U.S. legal history. Justice
Frankfurter and Justice Black posed this question when disputing the
meaning of the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.
Eleanor Roosevelt presented this issue to U.S. State Department
diplomats when creating the United Nations UDHR, and U.S. senators
debated it before giving advice and consent to the ratification of
ICCPR. And the question arises today when U.S. prosecutors and law
enforcement agencies cooperate with other nations to advance
foreign and domestic criminal cases.
This Article provides the answer to this question: core criminal
procedure. This standard both upholds defendants’ fundamental
rights and provides enough flexibility to facilitate cross-border law
enforcement realities. The approach already manifests itself in
347. See Methods of Work, INT’L, IMPARTIAL & INDEP. MECHANISM, https://iiim.un
.org/working-methods/ [https://perma.cc/7A98-KXD6] (“Once a final version is
adopted, the Methods of Work will be disseminated among various stakeholders,
including civil society, in order to provide transparency as to the Mechanism’s
approach to its core tasks.”).
348. Hum. Rts. Council, Rep. of the Indep. Investigative Mechanism for Myanmar,
¶¶ 36–37, U.N. Doc. A/HRC/42/66 (Aug. 7, 2019).
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incorporation, human rights, and electronic evidence doctrine; it must
also be applied to foreign evidence material to conviction, foreign
judgments material to sentencing, and extradition. Political theory
bolsters this approach, in which the three government branches
evaluate rights rooted in constitutional criminal procedural
guarantees, international human rights standards, and a functionalist
assessment rooted in comparative law. This framework then informs
U.S. engagement with international criminal tribunals and
investigative mechanisms.

